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The transnational advocacy campaign against Ecuador’s second oil-transporting 
pipeline, the Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado, had no impact on that state’s endorsement of 
the project and only a negligible effect on related social and environmental policies. This 
outcome is at odds with the theoretical formulation advanced by Keck and Sikkink which 
holds that certain transnational advocacy campaigns can act as agents of state-level policy 
changes. While Keck and Sikkink locate causal variables of campaign outcome on the 
levels of the campaign and the state, the Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado case signals the 
need to further incorporate international-level analysis and to investigate the implications 
of this third dimension for transnational advocacy campaign outcome. The case study 
presented herein suggests that theories of transnational advocacy sacrifice predictive 
power by ignoring the extent to which international economic and political structures can 
shape the preferences of states.  
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Transnational advocacy network theorists have developed a rich literature that 
attends to the network or its immediate (domestic) target. Intensive focus on these levels 
of analysis has translated into a wealth of writings on the emergence and sustainability of 
campaigns, the constructive dynamics of campaigns, and challenges presented by 
grassroots campaigning to democratic consolidation, for example. While theorists 
generally expect that actors from the international community will intervene in disputes 
between state and sub-state actors, few writers treat seriously this “third actor.” Rather, it 
often seems that transnational advocacy scholars have simply transplanted social 
movement theories to the international level without accounting for the additional 
dimension and attendant interaction dynamics. Efforts to graft social movement theories 
onto the international level have contributed to a static and superficial understanding of 
the potential impact of international-level actors on campaign outcome.  
There are good reasons to remedy this lopsided approach. Disregard for the 
pivotal international actor has undermined the predictive power and therefore the utility 
of these theories. Furthermore, examination of the significance of international actors will 
encourage penetrating questions about the foundations and characteristics of the current 
global system, both political and economic, and the implications of its structure for the 




 The aim of this thesis is to build on existing transnational advocacy literature by 
further incorporating international-level actors and by arguing that transnational 
advocacy practice and theory must confront the complexities of the international political 
economy. The first step towards this goal is to present the reader with a brief review of 
the principal findings of this theoretical approach as they were developed by Keck and 
Sikkink in Activists Beyond Borders. Theoretical discussion will be followed by a case 
study application with the purpose of demonstrating the predictive deficiencies of 
campaign-level analysis. A transnational campaign focused on Ecuador and its petroleum 
industry will serve here as the case study. This narrative will be presented in two parts in 
order facilitate separate examinations of the campaign’s origin and outcome; analysis of 
relevant theoretical and methodological considerations will follow each part. The 
concluding sections will comment on the value and possible directions of future research. 
A transnational campaign that aims to induce a norm shift on the national level is 
unlikely to succeed if the desired outcome substantially challenges dominant international 
values and the political structures that support them. In the end, specific, international-
level constellations of costs and benefits associated with a target’s response to campaign 
demands would seem to have as much to do with the outcome as campaign execution, the 
quality of the network or the nature of the campaign issue. With this in mind, it is 
reasonable to ponder the significance of the global political economy for transnational 
activism in general; certainly, this is one factor that is common to all transnational 
campaigns, and as such it provides a jumping-off point for future research into the 












ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: 




The term ‘Transnational Action Network’ or TAN, was adopted by Margaret 
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their 1998 book, Activists Beyond Borders. In this well-
received work, the authors used the term to refer to any network, or loose and fluid 
configuration, of activists who, whether tied primarily to national or international 
political arenas, collaborate in order to convince national governments to comply with 
activists’ demands and, by extension, with international norms and democratic principles.  
Humanitarian border-crossing was not, in 1998, a new phenomenon, but Keck and 
Sikkink were able to distill from the long history of TAN practice a fresh theoretically-
based understanding of the dynamics of TANs. Their discussion was compelling enough 
to inspire reactions from numerous scholars across disciplines, greatly expanding this 
body of political science research while also preserving its distinct in its blending of 
domestically-oriented Social Movement and International Relations theories and its 
unapologetically normative bent. The principal endeavors of this literature have been to 
1) define this brand of activism by identifying the actors, strategies and goals involved 
and, 2) develop a theory that accounts for the variation in outcome of such activism. This 
brief introductory review of the literature treats Keck and Sikkink’s formulation as 
representative of the literature at large; more recent formulations can be approached as 




Two years after its publication, Activists Beyond Borders earned Margaret Keck 
and Kathryn Sikkink the 2000 Grawemeyer Prize for Ideas Improving World Order.1 As 
the title of the award suggests, this work is decidedly focused on the potential of 
normative political activism for affecting social and political change on an international 
scale. In essence, Keck and Sikkink argue that there exists a community of activists that 
utilizes both domestic and foreign resources to induce national governments to abandon 
certain policies and positions deemed repressive, undemocratic, or otherwise ethically 
unacceptable. As such, the authors argue, this specific form of activism has great 
potential for transforming state behavior since domestic policy alignment with 
international norms is expected to lead to internalization of the preferred orientation.   
The authors discuss the normative beliefs that underpin the existence and actions 
of a TAN: participants’ goals, the constructive effects of normative work on the 
emergence and development of a TAN or of a single campaign, and so on. They link this 
discussion to a consideration of the types of soft and normative-based power (or 
“politics”) that TANs can draw on in the absence of traditional hard power: 
Informational, Symbolic, Leverage, or Accountability. In case-study format, they 
describe the current and recent campaigns of the TANs concerned with the three most 
popular issue areas: human rights, women’s rights, and environmental rights. 
Significantly, the authors offer a number of definitions that, in comparison to earlier 
related literature, are quite broad. Thus, a TAN is described as any group having 
members from at least two different countries, where at least one of these is an 
international actor and where organization is motivated by mutually held principles and 
values.  
                                                 




The book succinctly describes the patterns that characterize the interactions 
between TAN actors; the most successful and common of these being referred to as the 
“boomerang.” In this particular pattern, domestic activists, unable to access or influence 
their national government, seek out an international ally who is able and willing to 
project their message in a compelling and effective manner to the international 
community. Actors from this broader community then attempt to use their leverage in 
order to petition the unresponsive national government to address the grievances of the 
domestic activists. Historically, boomerang patterns of activism have had varying 
success; the failure rate of transnational action network campaigns is high.   
In fact, Tarrow finds that, in general, “transnational intervention fails more often 
than it succeeds.”2 Given this tendency towards negative campaign outcomes, the ability 
to identify the factors that determine variation in outcome is central to the development of 
a comprehensive theory. This is also a matter of potential interest to the network actors, 
as they stand to gain significantly from being able to assess, in advance of its initiation, 
the chances of success of any single campaign. As Keck and Sikkink note, the costs of 
organizing and acting on the transnational level are enormous so that, while the logic 
behind the formation of a transnational action network is likely of an altruistic nature, the 
activists that create them are prone to think strategically about their humanitarian efforts.  
Keck and Sikkink, adopting an exploratory approach in order to identify the 
reasons for success or failure in a number of empirical cases, find that their dependent 
variable (campaign outcome) is determined by four independent variables. 
 The first of these concerns the characteristics of the state being targeted by the 
campaign. The authors expect success to be most likely when the targeted state is 
                                                 




responsive to pressure. Lobbying from within the state is most likely to be effective in a 
democratic, rather than authoritarian, domestic context. External influence is most likely 
to achieve results when the targeted state’s position in the international system makes it 
vulnerable. Various conditions might heighten vulnerability: if a state is party to 
international agreements, is seeking to maintain or increase its access to the international 
market, is seeking recognition as a democratic state, or generally stands to gain or lose 
economic opportunities as a consequence of its international reputation. The authors state 
“Vulnerability arises both from the availability of leverage and the target’s sensitivity to 
leverage; if either is missing, a campaign may fail.”3  
The second independent variable concerns the specific manner in which a 
campaign is cast; Keck and Sikkink write at length of the importance of strategic issue 
framing and resonance. A frame, or conceptual presentation, is most likely to succeed 
when it is presented in a manner that makes explicit that 1) there is a right and a wrong 
side between which the public must choose, 2) the problem is not naturally occurring, but 
rather a result of human action and intent 3) there is, consequently,  someone who bears 
the blame for the creation of the problem and, 4) the stakes of campaign success are high, 
as in a life-or-death outcome for innocent victims. The frame is selected in order to 
achieve maximum issue resonance, meaning that the intended audience will experience 
empathy with the victims and a desire to engage personally with the campaign.  
The third independent variable concerns the publics’ perception of the activists 
themselves. In order to be effective, the activists must be seen as truthful reporters and 
trustworthy messengers. The public must believe that activists are legitimate 
representatives of the victims; this is particularly important in those circumstances under 
                                                 




which a first-world activist claims to act on behalf of a third-world victim. Relationships 
between activists must be transparent and unproblematic.  
The final causal variable concerns the quality of the network itself. Keck and 
Sikkink emphasize that the size and the density of a network are directly related to its 
ability to conduct a successful campaign or bring pressure to bear on the targeted state. 
Size of a network simply refers to the number of members it claims. Density, a more 
complex concept, is the measure of the number, quality and strength of the ties that exist 
between network members. Such ties allow for smooth transfer of resources, coordination 
of action, information dissemination, and access to powerful potential allies. Size and 
density are related concepts in so far as changes in one measure can be expected to have 
an impact on the other. 
That three of the four independent variables focus on the network and its 
campaign clearly indicates that Keck and Sikkink find outcome to be primarily dependent 
on campaign-level factors. The fourth independent variable concerns the vulnerability of 
the target to international-level actors that are in alliance with the TAN; the authors do 
not consider that these actors might work to oppose the TAN or to shield the target from 
TAN pressure. They also neglect to discuss whether networks can create an ally where 
there is none, or bolster it where it is insufficiently powerful vis-à-vis the target. 
Generally, Keck and Sikkink do not consider the complexity of the international scheme 
or its component parts. The reason for their intense focus on campaign-level factors can 
be found in the conclusion of their work wherein the authors discuss the ways in which 
their theory is distinct from Liberalism.  




can act as the “motor of change,” and enjoy a notable degree of influence on the national 
and international level.4 According to Keck and Sikkink, Liberalism holds that 
individuals structure the preferences of (democratic) states and, by extension, impact 
inter-state interaction. However, these individuals’ behaviors are informed by risk-averse 
self-interest, and not principles or values, and so cannot explain how individuals might 
influence other self-interested individual-level actors to adopt a position similar to their 
own. In essence, Liberalism holds that change occurs via a one-way vertical structure of 
influence and communication that links sub-state to state levels and state to international 
levels. 
In contrast, theories of transnational network advocacy envision that horizontal 
contact is established between actors, frequently as a result of already-existing 
complimentary values. However, where similar values do not yet exist, a network can 
facilitate communication between actors; such exchanges have a constructivist effect on 
network participants that speeds the development of shared values. Essentially, the 
authors imagine that self-interest is necessarily tied to a specific context while certain 
values are potentially universal, located in the individual and rather than in a particular 
political or social context. Communicating these values to others can trigger mobilization 
around shared principles and, where a state resists actors’ attempts to influence its 
preferences from within then coordination between the network and a power-wielding 
ally on the international level can structure state preference from without.  
It follows from this theoretical foundation that the character of the network is of 
utmost importance, since only a network can facilitate constructivist exchanges and then 
only under certain conditions. Of secondary importance is the character of the state; 
                                                 




democracy allows for influence from within while the absence of democracy can lead to 
efforts to influence state preferences form without. Lagging far behind are network allies 
originating in the level of the international system. Their origins, characters, preferences 
remain a mystery. To a great degree, the authors leave to chance the probability that a 
network will secure international-level leverage that is both powerful and relevant 
enough to restructure the target’s preferences and thereby consolidate change.  






























In August of 2003, the Ecuadorian government announced the completion of the 
Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado [Heavy Crude Pipeline, or OCP], Ecuador’s second oil-
transporting pipeline. The government, the project financiers and the oil industry praised 
its modern technological features that, they claimed, would minimize the pipeline’s 
environmental and social impacts. A network of environmental and human rights activists 
from the international, national, regional and local arenas rejected this claim and assailed 
the government’s decision to construct the OCP.  
Such wildly contrasting claims are common to the debate over oil activity in 
Ecuador. Oil exploration and exploitation activities have grown steadily in scope and 
frequency since Texaco’s 1964 discovery of reserves in the eastern Amazon. Anti-oil 
activism began in the 1970s and increased in intensity and prevalence in the mid 1980s. 
Indigenous activism also began in the 1970s with the opposition by the Shuar nation to 
the oil industry’s presence on their traditional lands and, by the early 1990s, gained 
sufficient momentum to constitute a powerful, national-level social movement with a 
political wing. Given the 30-year history of oil industry and opposition in Ecuador, it is 
not premature to ask whether and how the state has adjusted its national environmental 
and social policies over time and in response to transnational activism.  




pipelines facilitates just such a longitudinal investigation. These two projects, sitting as 
brackets around three decades of oil activity in Ecuador, and were the products of very 
different policy environments. The first of these, the Sistema de Oleoducto Trans-
Ecuatoriano [Transecuadorian Pipeline System, or SOTE], was constructed in 1969. In 
every respect, the SOTE project is a prime example of decision-making in an 
unconstrained policy environment, in which policies were created and adopted in 
complete absence of governmental or citizen regulation and oversight. The design 
process and initial construction phases of the SOTE predated the passage of Ecuador’s 
first national laws regulating petroleum activities.  It also preceded the arrival of 
international human rights and environmental organizations to Ecuador, and the 
formation of their national counterparts. Not surprisingly, neither the pace of construction 
nor the methods and materials employed reflected then-current industry standards or 
technological capabilities.5 The SOTE project is the historical precursor of the second 
pipeline and its attendant policy environment, and serves as an example of the nature and 
impact of unconstrained state decision-making. 
In contrast, the OCP was the subject of intense debate lasting more than one 
decade. Policy negotiations date to 1989 when oil companies holding new exploration 
and exploitation contracts in Ecuador suggested to the government that the SOTE would 
be incapable of transporting future increases in production. During the protracted debate, 
a multiplicity of actors voiced their positions within a formally democratic national 
context, as each sought to influence the policy environment that prevailed during the 
conception and construction of the OCP.  A number of these actors collaborated to form 
an advocacy network that sought to mobilize international and domestic support for its 
                                                 




anti-OCP position.  
The state also took an active and visible role in the debate, particularly during the 
five-year period between the planning and design phases and the completion of the OCP. 
In many ways, it would seem that the state broke with its traditional disregard for 
environmental dimensions of national development policy. For example, it adopted a 
number of new environmental policy norms, required Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIAs) from OCP Consortium members, established monitoring mechanisms, and 
expanded the institutional framework in support of these new responsibilities. The state 
also modified its position on the indigenous question; in 1990, for example, the state 
transferred the legal title to more than 3 million acres of land in the Amazonian Basin to 
indigenous communities.6
The question is whether these individual policies were indicative of the broader 
environmental and social orientation of the state and if they were formulated in response 
and accordance to the demands of the TAN. The conclusion is that, despite a marked 
difference in the salience of environmental and social issues during the policy 
development stages in the two cases, the government ignored TAN demands by refusing 
to prioritize the environmental and social dimensions of the OCP project. Thus, the TAN 
did not influence the normative or policy positions of the state in regards to the OCP. 
Rather, the Ecuadorian state continued to circumvent the requirements of its own national 
laws, undermine the capacity of domestic institutional mechanisms for regulation and 
enforcement, discount its obligations under international agreements and dismiss the 
recommendations of international experts and activists. In short, the TAN was ineffective 
since its OCP campaign can be classified as a failure.   
                                                 




Analysis of the effects of the policy environments surrounding the two projects 
will go forth in a loosely comparative fashion. Since the Ecuadorian case is intended to 
serve as a partial test of Keck and Sikkink’s theoretical approach and predictions, 
discussion on the theoretical and methodological shortcomings of Activists Beyond 
Borders will be interspersed with the presentation and analysis of empirical findings. The 
goal will be to show that the Ecuadorian case seriously challenges several central 
theoretical claims and methodological approaches of the literature, and to explore the 





























The Ecuadorian case unfolds over a period of thirty years. With the benefit of 
substantial room to practice hindsight, it will readily become clear that SOTE policies 
caused alarming environmental degradation and dislocating social effects. Unfortunately, 
the results of state policies during the OCP era are less clear. This is primarily due to the 
simple fact that few years have elapsed since the completion of the OCP: environmental 
impact might be latent, and the research community has had little time to perform and 
publish environmental assessments of the project in its operational stage. Such 
asymmetry points to the need to account for time issues in the research design. Pierson 
finds that institutional change and maturation are not quick processes, where they occur 
at all. The appropriate time frame for evaluation is furthermore related to the 
measurement of effectiveness applied in evaluating the outcome.  
 Keck and Sikkink do not provide measurements for or definitions of 
effectiveness. Instead, they treat effectiveness as a fluid concept best specified on a per-
campaign basis and in relation to the goals of that campaign. Thus, the authors state that  
 
Activists in advocacy networks are concerned with political effectiveness. Their 
definition of effectiveness often includes some policy change by ‘target actors’ 
such as governments, international financial institutions like the World Bank, or 
private actors like transnational corporations.7
 
                                                 




Accordingly, effectiveness can be evaluated by simply determining whether a 
target has responded to a TAN campaign with some change in policy. The case of the 
Ecuadorian TAN indicates that the government and Texaco were targeted, but neither 
responded to activist demands (for sustainable pipeline construction or a moratorium) by 
systematically altering policy. By Keck and Sikkink’s criteria, three decades of TAN 
activism in Ecuador have been completely ineffective. 
Some authors suggest that assessment of the effectiveness of an organization 
should be based not on the achievement of its goals but on the structure and strategy of 
the organization itself. Sowa et al. support this approach, suggesting that the management 
of a certain organization is key, that outcomes may be objective or perceptual or both, 
and that corresponding distinctions are needed in order to identify, operationalize and test 
the outcome.8 Laraia goes a step further to argue that the measure, the unit of analysis and 
the predicted effectiveness are interrelated; she presents a table (roughly reproduced here) 
that shows three possible approaches to these integrated elements:  
 
Measure:               capacity    performance          achievement 
Unit of Analysis:  structure                    process          outcome 
Predicting:            performance             achievement          survivability 
 
Thus, the measurement of effectiveness can change, so long as the unit of 
analysis, the predictive goal, and the unit of measurement vary correspondingly.9 This 
idea approaches a more realistic acknowledgment of complexity of TAN goals (targeted 
practices that are connected to other elements of societal ordering) and network structure 
(the multiplicity of actors, motivations, culture-specific practices, and funding sources) 
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than does the guideline offered by Keck and Sikkink. 
Where policy change constitutes effectiveness, per Keck and Sikkink’s 
recommendation, the definitional scope depends on whether one most values a simple 
(revocable) policy change, institutionalization of a policy change (provisions for 
enforcement and funding), or a fundamental and general norm shift. The flexibility of 
Laraia’s conceptualization notwithstanding, one may well question the value of defining 
effectiveness as a shift in policy without distinguishing between policy formulation and 
implementation, and without specifying a time frame for assessing the degree of 
implementation. For example, Arsel questions whether the ‘freezing’ of the Akkuyu 
nuclear power plant proposal, which enjoyed the full support of the Turkish government, 
“qualifies the networks as a success story?”10 He concludes that it is “premature” to 
assume that a freeze of the proposal is equivalent to a long-term re-orientation on the part 
of the government, and states, generally, that policy shifts are “best interpreted as a short-
term strategic victory.”11 In making this argument, Arsel puts forth an insightful 
observation about the significance of “negative versus affirmative” success, saying that,  
The impact from the advocacy efforts may be time delayed. Negative success, the 
freezing of the Akkuyu project for instance, is often half the story. To sustain such 
a decision, major policy shifts need to take place and new alliances need to be 
made.12
 
With this is counsel mind, it is reasonable to argue that, where policy outcome is 
to be the focus for evaluating TAN effectiveness, then effectiveness should be gauged by, 
at a minimum, the following standards: 1) in comparison to other theoretically possible 
results, 2) in terms of the durability of the result, as seen in efforts to enforce or 
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institutionalize the achievement, and 3) in terms of the scope of the impact, i.e., whether 
its application is issue-specific or represents a fundamental norm shift.  
Applying these criteria, it is clear that the OCP campaign failed to prevent the 
construction of the pipeline and had little or no impact on policies governing its design, 
construction, or operation. However, the campaign did cause the state to make small 
adjustments to its policies concerning the secondary environmental and social impacts of 
the pipeline; while these were issue-specific, they have thus far been enforced. On 
balance, the campaign was completely ineffective but the TAN can be credited with small 
achievements. 
Where it is relevant, institutional change made during the 1970s is considered a 
completed process, while institutional adjustments made during the 1990s is regarded as 
provisional and inconclusive. It is also reasonable to expect that environmental and 
institutional lessons learned from the SOTE era might have been applied during the OCP 
era; a temporal analysis should ask whether and how institutional learning has occurred. 
For these reasons, it is appropriate to place greatest emphasis on the outcomes of the 
SOTE case: the environmental impacts that have been observed and an understanding of 
their origins and implications. Conversely, it is most reasonable to focus on policy 
development stages in the OCP case: design and siting of the pipeline, treatment of 
relevant scientific information and evidence of learning, and the influence of a 
democratic national context. 
It is important, particularly since I will emphasize different aspects of the two 
projects, that some elements are held constant. To this end, both case study discussions 




Social and Environmental Impact. The first category (Actors and Institutional Capacity) 
encompasses those factors most salient to the development of policy: who influenced the 
pipeline agenda and how; and, whether the state had, or attempted to establish, the 
capacity to manage social and environmental issues through legislation, monitoring, and 
enforcement. It is important to consider both the state’s preferred procedural and 
normative position, and scrutinize its efforts to ensure sufficient institutional capacity in 
support of its stated goals.  
The second category (Social and Environmental Impact) describes the direct and 
indirect outcomes of policy decisions. This is accomplished by asking: what impacts 
followed directly from the design and management of the pipelines; and what cumulative 
impacts are associated with the pipeline projects? In answering these questions, it is 
helpful to investigate the policy provisions for community consultation, physical design, 




























Four features common to both pipeline project eras have complicated the state’s 
role in and responsibility for environmental stewardship and minority rights provision. 
The first of these factors concerns the national political landscape. Prior to and during the 
SOTE period, a series of military governments and coup-based power transitions defined 
the makeup and nature of the state. Junta governments typically governed by decree, and 
tended to insulate the country from certain external influences, like non-governmental 
scientists and activists. Military governments predicated internal legitimacy on successful 
economic policies, which commonly translated into resource-intensive development 
schemes. 
Democratic constitutional rule, reestablished in the 1980s, did little to restrain the 
armed forces or lengthen political time horizons. Presidential instability and the 
occasional disbanding of Congress and the Supreme Court have encouraged volatile 
policy shifts and created an inhospitable environment for institutional maturation. Not 
surprisingly, state agencies hold conflicting and frequently-shifting mandates for policy 
implementation, oversight and enforcement. These effects are compounded by a highly 
fragmented party system that results in frequent governmental gridlock. The short 
political timeframes common to all Ecuadorian politicians create incentives to prioritize 
short-term goals, like job creation, over those goals requiring sustained action and having 




Second, national economic factors have contributed significant disincentives for 
and barriers to the prioritization of environmental management. Given the incentive to 
emphasize economic development and the lack of comparable alternative exports, it is 
not surprising that every government since the mid-1960s has designed its economic 
policies around the petroleum industry. Flores and Merrill note that, “Petroleum was the 
single most important element in the Ecuadorian economy, accounting for over 14 
percent of the GDP in 1986, two-thirds of all export revenues in that year, and much of 
the foreign investment.”13  The dominant position of petroleum within the national 
economy has gone unchallenged for four decades and, when placed in context of the 
requirements of external debt service, promises to be self-replicating. This factor has 
increased in importance over time, as a mushrooming external debt intensified the need to 
accumulate capital. As Watts notes: “During the 1980s, the pressure for debt service 
coupled with a neoliberal agenda imposed by a series of civilian governments placed 
further pressures on opening new oil concessions . . .”14
Governmental decisions to carry out structural economic adjustments as required 
by lending terms of multilateral financial institutions have increased the volatility of 
domestic politics making it an unattractive political option; nevertheless, the state 
continues to bend to the will of its creditors.  In short, economic reality has constrained 
policy options, encouraged uneven institutional development, and predisposed the 
government to act in favor of development projects, particularly within the energy sector 
of the economy. 
The third significant challenge to the state’s capacity for environmental 
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stewardship is Ecuador’s physical landscape.  The country is divided into four vertically-
arranged regions that have distinct climates, seasonal variations and cycles, and 
temperatures. Mainland pipeline routes necessarily transverse the three continental 
regions: the Amazon, the Sierra and the Coast. The geographical and climatic variation 
along a single pipeline route is problematic for pipeline siting, construction and 
maintenance. For example, the timing of the rainy season varies by region: October-April 
for the Sierra; January-April for the Coast; year-round in the Amazon. Nevertheless, all 
regions are vulnerable to flooding and mud- and landslides, events that threaten pipeline 
integrity. Pipeline design must account for variation within and between the regions. 
Oil reserves are primarily located within the Amazon Basin of the Sucumbíos 
province in the Oriente, or eastern portion of the country constituting one half of 
Ecuador’s total geographic area.15 This region maintains an equatorial climate, meaning 
that is notable for its precipitation rates and high temperatures. Ports and refineries are 
located along the western coast. The coast is a sub-tropical environment that is vulnerable 
to large-scale climatic influences that originate with oceanic currents, like the Peruvian 
Current and El Niño.16  
The Oriente’s reserves are separated from western coastal ports by the Sierra, or 
Andean Cordillera, a north-south mountain range with a peak altitude of 6,267 meters 
(20,560 feet) above sea level. In the Andes, climate, river currents, and temperature vary 
with altitude.  The Andean snow pack gives rise to several major river systems. German 
scientist Alexander Von Humboldt coined the term ‘Volcano Alley’ in reference to the 
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portion of the Inter-Andean valley that is lined by thirty-three volcanoes.17 Of these, nine 
volcanoes are classified as active, and Cotopaxi is recognized as the world’s highest 
active volcano. Beginning with a significant eruption in November of 2002, El 
Reventador entered a phase of volcanic activity “generally shifting from effusive towards 
explosive;” the more active Guagua Pichincha erupted in 1981, 1982, 1997, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2002 and 2004.18 Lahar flows (mixtures of ash, rock, lava and water) are common 
both in conjunction with and independent of volcanic eruptions, and seismic activity 
occurs daily along Ecuador’s thousands of fault lines.19  
Because Ecuador is one of the world’s most ‘mega-diverse’ countries, the 
environmental stakes are high and there is little room for error. According to the 
President of Ecuador's Advisory Commission on Environmental Means:  “Ecuador has 
twice the plant and animal species of the United States and Canada together, four times 
more than all of Europe, and the largest number of plant species per unit of area in the 
Americas.”20   Ecuador claims some 1,600 bird species in total; the Mindo Nambillo 
Cloudforest Reserve alone houses more than 450 species of birds, of which 46 are close 
to extinction.21 EarthTrend’s application of the Protected Area Management Categories, 
as developed by The World Conservation Union, reveals that, in 2003, Ecuador had 12% 
of its total land area under Categories I and II protection (for scientific, wilderness and 
ecosystem protection, and conservation of specific natural features).22 Of the total 
national land area, 26% is under some degree of protection.23
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Finally, Ecuador is also distinguished in the diversity of its social landscape. 
Although some estimates vary drastically, indigenous people are commonly thought to 
number 4.5 million, or about 45 percent of the national population.24 This segment of the 
population is further divisible by particular ethnic identity; there are at least twelve 
nations, each with its own language, culture and history.25 The vast majority of the 
indigenous population lives in the Sierra, or mountainous regions, and was integrated 
with the national culture and economy through feudalistic land tenure arrangements that 
prevailed until the 1964 Agrarian Land Reform. While this reform was sweeping, it 
lacked the institutional backing to be effectively implemented. An immediate result was 
that the Sierra indigenous population that lacked the resources needed to acquire land in 
the highlands. 
A second and related legacy of the agrarian reform was the rush of dislocated 
migrants from the Sierra to the Amazonian region. The government facilitated this 
relocation by declaring agriculturally unproductive land abandoned, and granting land 
titles to any person who made Aproductive use of at least 80% of a holding.”26 Many 
large landowners, fearing expropriation of their lands under the 1964 reform, sold off 
large amounts of (poor quality) land and headed to the Oriente, where the government’s 
incentive package for colonizers included funding and protection for new landowners. 
For example, one report mentions that, “. . . colonists normally received a forty- to fifty- 
hectare parcel in contrast to the minifundio typically awarded former sharecroppers or 
huasipungueros.”27  
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Barraclough and Eguren note that the Ecuadorian Agrarian Reform and 
Colonization Institute (IERAC) “assigned over 2.5 million hectares of  “vacant” state 
lands, mostly in the Amazonian forest region, to some 60,000 colonists” in the two 
decades following the reform.28 An estimated 250,000 to 300,000 colonizers lived in the 
Oriente by 1997.29 This planned colonization of the Oriente misappropriated lands 
traditionally occupied by a variety of uncontacted ethnic groups. The state’s promotion of 
colonization of the Oriente continued ever after it ratified the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 which states that “The rights of ownership and 
possession of [indigenous peoples] over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall 
be recognised.”30  
Amazonian indigenous nations that historically had enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy from the national government and economy organized against the invasion of 
industry and colonizers.  The Federation of Shuar Centers was founded as a local activist 
group in the Amazon Basin in 1964, while highlanders established a regional indigenous 
organization, ECUARUNARI, in 1972. As oil extraction activities spread, CONFENAIE 
was established in 1980 as a regional body representing the interests of 500,000 
indigenous Amazonians (Wilkenfeld). Each of these groups demanded that the 
government redistribute appropriated land according to historical and cultural basis of 
ownership. As Kimerling notes, “Legalization and demarcation of indigenous territories 
has long been the frontline of defence used by indigenous organizations to protect 
indigenous peoples from the oil boom.”31 Thus, in a single decade and in the absence of 
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any precedent, the opening of the Oriente sparked a movement in support of ethnically-
based land rights and the creation of  two strong regional organizations.  
The land issue gained salience during the OCP era as the increasing strength of 
the indigenous movement forced the government to confront the issue. In 1981, the state 
passed La Ley Forestal y de Conservación de Áreas Naturales y Vida Silvestre [Law of 
Forestry and Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife]. This legislation focused 
exclusively on the Oriente, claiming subsurface soil rights for the state. In 1986, the 
regional organizations ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE united to form CONAIE. This 
organization’s first national demonstrations were organized  in protest to governmental 
land reform proposals in 1990 and again in 1994.32 Indeed, CONAIE that has consistently 
made “integral agrarian reform one its key demands” is made clear by the inclusion of 
land titling at the top of its list of demands during the 1990 uprising and by the 
government’s descision to respond to the 1990 strike by dispatching IERAC officials to 
negotiate with the leadership of CONAIE.33 However, while these uprisings did force 
proposal modifications resulting in increased protection for communal territory integrity 
and in the transfer of legal title to three million acres of traditional lands to the 
Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (OPIP), they did little to systematically 
improve the status of indigenous land rights.34 The 1995 establishment of CONAIE’s 
political arm, Pachakutik, resulted in the reintroduction of the land issue onto the national 
political agenda while the on-going legal and physical oil-related conflicts in the Oriente 
have earned Ecuadorian land issues a place on the international agenda. 
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Actors and Institutional Capacity.  
  In 1964, Texpet, a subsidiary of Texaco-Petroleum Company, concluded the first 
successful oil exploration in Ecuador’s Amazon rainforest. The following year, a Joint 
Operating Agreement known as the ‘Napo Agreement’ established Texaco’s sole 
responsibility for the construction and operation of all facilities and infrastructure 
necessary for oil exploitation and transportation until 1990, at which time the state would 
have the option of assuming control of the consortium. In 1969, the government and the 
Texpet Consortium agreed to construct the SOTE. The pipeline’s 480-km route 
originated in concession areas in the north-eastern Amazon and terminated at 
Esmeralda’s oil refinery and ports on the western coast. It was the world’s highest 
pipeline, peaking at 4,064 meters above sea level as it crosses the Andes.35  The SOTE 
was initially designed to carry as many as 250,000 barrels per day of high-value light 
crude.36
The military government of General Lara implemented the country’s first 
petroleum law after SOTE construction commenced.  La Ley de Hidrocarburos de 1971 
[Hydrocarbon Law of 1971] required that oil companies take those measures necessary 
for the protection of the “flora and fauna,” and prohibited the burning of natural gas 
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without governmental permission.37  Article 29 of the law established that: “Contractors 
are obligated to: (e) employ modern and efficient machinery; (s) adopt necessary methods 
to protect plants, animals, and other natural resources ; (t) avoid contamination of waters, 
air and lands.”38 These obligations were reiterated, but not further specified, in the 
Hydrocarbon Laws of 1974 and 1978 and the Hydrocarbon Law Reform of 1982.  
  In 1972, the Texpet consortium completed the construction of the SOTE. During 
the same year, the state negotiated the Contrato para exploración y explotación de 
hidrocarburos entre Texaco Petroleum Company y Ecuadorian Gulf Oil Company 
[Contract between the Texaco Petroleum Company and the Ecuadorian Gulf Company 
for the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons].  Powers and Quarles find that, “the 
language in the contract reflects the prohibitions included in the [1971 Hydrocarbon] 
law.”39 Finally, in 1973, Gustavo Jarrín Ampudia, Minister of Natural Resources, entered 
Ecuador into the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
renegotiated governmental contracts with private foreign oil companies, extending them 
until June of 1992. 
Thus, the SOTE was conceived of and partially constructed before the creation of 
legal and institutional mechanisms providing for governmental control of the 
hydrocarbon industry, and it was completed before Ecuador committed to any 
international production standards. Furthermore, state policies, where they existed, 
centralized legislative and regulatory functions under the executive. General Lara 
facilitated this concentration of power by creating a national oil company, the 
Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana [Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation, or 
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CEPE], in 1972. The CEPE gained a 62% majority interest ownership of the Consortium 
in 1976, and in 1986 the company became the sole owner of the Transecuadorian pipeline 
in 1986. 
The state preference for centralization of legislative and oversight functions was 
also evident in the design of a new agency, the Dirección General de Medio Ambiente 
[General Directorate of the Environment, or DIGEMA]. This executive-branch agency 
was established in1984 under the auspices and control of the Ministerio de Energía y 
Minas [Ministry of Energy and Mines, or MEM]. The inherent conflict of interest and the 
potential for the subordination of DIGEMA’s environmental mission are clear when one 
considers the MEM’s primary mission: to promote and facilitate extractive industry.  
 
 
Social and Environmental Impact.   
Spills caused by breaks in the pipelines have resulted in extensive environmental 
damage in Ecuador. Physical compromise of the SOTE has resulted primarily from poor 
planning for and response to natural disasters, and from substandard or nonextant 
maintenance. 
The potential for environmental disaster caused by the state decision to route the 
SOTE through areas known for volcanic and seismic volatility was not accounted for 
through pipeline design or emergency contingency planning. Two 1987 earthquakes 
(magnitudes 6.1 and 6.9) occurred “along the SOTE alignment” in the area of volcanic 
activity known as Quito/Reventador.40 Slope and river dam failures and massive 
landslides destroyed seventy kilometers of the SOTE, resulting in plummeting production 
                                                 




rates and a five-month repair and cleanup effort. As there were no disaster response plans 
in place, the cleanup effort was coordinated and financed by the World Bank through its 
Emergency Petroleum Reconstruction Project.41 This was “the most extensive naturally 
induced pipeline outage ever experienced in the world.”42 The duration of the outage 
reflects the lack of contingency planning and the necessarily improvised nature of 
remediation efforts. 
One year later, the SOTE ruptured during a landslide near Esmeraldas, the 
destination port. Unfarallon reports that, “Oil flowed down the streets of the town and 
into the river.  Around 10 pm, a spark ignited the oil.  Twelve people died from the 
flames, six more were never found.”43  A SOTE rupture in August 1992 spilled 
275,000-gallons, “caused the Rio Napo to run black for days, and forced downstream 
Peru and Brazil to declare national states of emergency for the affected regions.”44  
Unfarallan reports that in the first two decades of operation, the SOTE sustained 
“more than 60 major ruptures resulting in 614,000 barrels of spilled oil B more than twice 
the 260,000 barrels that were spilled by the Exxon Valdez.”45 Knudson notes that, “By 
contrast, the 800-mile trans-Alaskan pipeline, which came on line in 1977 and carries 
more than twice as much oil, has spilled just 85,000 barrels.”46  The Organization of 
American States added that Aruptures of secondary pipelines have resulted in substantial 
additional discharge into the environment. An additional 1,000 to 2,000 gallons of oil 
reportedly spill from the flowlines connecting the wells to the stations every two 
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State siting decisions also left the SOTE vulnerable to guerillas that operate in the 
Oriente. Human activity has frequently undermined the physical integrity of the SOTE, 
resulting in oil spillage. In acts of sabotage and anti-oil protest, the SOTE has been 
attacked and bombed. The steady increase in militarization along the pipeline route is 
evident. The government responded to oil-related strikes and protests in the Sucumbios, 
Napo and Orellana provinces by declaring numerous states of emergency, some lasting as 
long as two months.48 Rene Bucaram, former director of Texaco’s Ecuador operations, 
accused the state-run CEPE of capitalizing on the instances of human sabotage to divert 
attention from the true causes of SOTE spills. After the 2001 “River Toachi” spill, he told 
Reuters:  “They aren't going to keep tricking us that this was caused by a bomb. This is 
poor management of the pipeline, and it's time the government provides an 
explanation.”49  
Increasingly, paramilitary groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Ecuador (FARE) have claimed responsibility for attacks. The FARE is modeled on and 
articulated with Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and its 
presence in Ecuador underscores fears that the spillover of Colombia’s civil war into the 
northeastern provinces of Ecuador translates into intensifying security threats to 
Ecuador’s pipelines. Amazon Watch notes that, “In the past 12 years, Colombia’s Caño 
Limon oil pipeline has been attacked more than 700 times by guerrilla groups, spilling 
more than two million barrels of crude oil. Five attacks on Ecuador’s SOTE have already 
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left several people dead.”50 Thus, while the siting of the pipeline in the northeastern 
provinces of Ecuador increased the possibility of significant, negative environmental 
impact resulting from local insurgency, state policy has been strictly retroactive.  
 Most of what is known about the impact of oil operations in the Amazon during 
the first two decades has been collected, analyzed and distributed by individuals working 
through extra-governmental forums. Judith Kimerling’s study of the environmental and 
social impacts of oil activities in the Ecuadorian Amazon was the first critical 
documentation and assessment ever made public; it appeared in English in 1991 and then 
in Spanish in 1993. This pioneering work “elevated oil contamination in Ecuador to the 
status of an international environmental problem. It was the first time that clear evidence 
was presented to the media, the government, and the oil companies, that supported the 
claims of the communities.”51 Amazon Crude garnered high-level attention within the 
NGO community, which reacted quickly by publicizing the information gathered by 
Kimerling. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) led the pack by publishing 
the 1991 English version. Robert F Kennedy, Jr., then staff counsel for the NRDC, wrote 
a preface that promised plenty of facts:   
Discharges from secondary pipelines have never been estimated or recorded; 
however, the smaller flowlines discharge approximately 10,000 gallons per week 
of petroleum into the Amazon, and each day production pits dump an astounding 
4.3 million gallons of toxic production wastes and treatment chemicals into 
Amazonia's rivers, streams and groundwater.52   
 
 In addition to quantifying the direct environmental damage, Kimerling’s narrative 
contributed to an understanding of the cumulative impacts of the oil industry in Ecuador 
by describing the process from cradle-to-grave. For example, she noted that petroleum 
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companies constructed many roads into the Amazon in order to facilitate access to the 
concession areas and import construction equipment to build exploitation facilities. This 
caused mass deforestation, threatened endangered species, and disrupted ecosystems. 
Kimerling also documented the leeching and dumping of toxic byproducts, and traced the 
effects of these practices on the health of the Oriente’s indigenous inhabitants. Kimerling 
made clear that these peoples depended on the freshwater Amazonian river system for 
bathing, cooking, and drinking and food cultivation purposes and looked to the rainforest 
in general for medicine, education, sustenance, shelter, cultural customs and spiritual 
identities.  
A second wave of environmental impact assessment was generated in the course 
of on-going, class-action civil suits against Texaco and other petroleum companies. 
Aguinda v Texaco, brought on behalf of indigenous Amazonian inhabitants against 
Texaco, was filed by an Ecuadorian expatriate lawyer in the New York court system in 
1993 under the provision of the US Alien Claims Tort Act. The fact-finding missions 
mandated by this and by subsequent trials have reduced scientific uncertainty about the 
environmental effects of certain industry procedures. They have also affirmed the links 
between environmental degradation and pollution and the destruction of the habitats, 
culture, livelihoods and physical wellbeing of the Amazonian indigenous population.   
Fact-finding in Aguinda v Texaco has primarily focused on Texaco’s operations 
policies in three areas of activity: exploration, exploitation, and infrastructure. 
Exploration phases rely on seismic testing, remote sensing and satellite imagery and 
mapping to detect the presence of oil reserves. This process requires that land is cleared 




access roads to test well sites are constructed. The road construction is extensive and 
extremely invasive; as O’Rourke and Connolly explain, “mobile rigs for temporary 
drilling can weigh over 2 million pounds” and the effort to gain access means that 
substantially “clearing land for roads and platforms can lead to deforestation and 
erosion.”53  
The second activity area, exploitation, is a two-part process. First, the extraction 
of crude from the ground relies on heavy machinery for the construction and operation of 
pumping stations. Then, the separation of the crude’s constituent elements requires the 
use of toxic chemicals, including benzene, toluene, xylene, mercury, and lead. In its 20-
year operation in Ecuador, Texaco routinely dumped the formation waters (totaling 
464,766,540 barrels) into open and unlined pits and nearby tributaries, and burned (or 
“flared”) an estimated 235 billion cubic feet of natural gas byproduct.54 Aguinda v Texaco 
charges that Texaco’s production pits released “4.3 million gallons of toxic waste and 
treated chemical” into the environment.55
The third area of activity scrutinized by Aguinda v Texaco is infrastructure 
construction. This broad category of activity includes the construction of access 
roadways; extraction, pumping, heating and transfer stations; central and secondary 
pipelines; 340 wells and 1000 pits; hard-waste dumps; helicopter landing strips; worker 
housing; and company towns. Infrastructure was often poorly designed and maintained. 
For example, Texaco spread crude waste on roadways, purportedly to decrease the 
amount of air-borne dust resulting from deforestation and construction of access roads.56 
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Conventional wisdom holds that access roads, such as those constructed by the oil 
companies, open areas to “colonizers, land speculators and loggers . . .”57  
Comparative research by Powers and Quarles indicates that: “Chevron’s decision 
to discharge saline produced water to surface waters in Ecuador was made at a time when 
these same discharges would have not have been allowed in U.S. oilfields in similar 
situations exactly because it was known that such discharges would have severely 
harmful impacts on the environment and human health.”58 Thus, Power and Quarles find 
that, in its decision relating to discharge of production water, its design of waste pits, and 
its use of production water flaring, Texaco violated industry and international standards 
based on an scientific consensus regarding the environmental impacts of such practices. 
 Texaco states that it has “always worked with the technology that was consistent 
with generally accepted international standards at the time it operated the fields in 
Ecuador. The technology used by Texaco Petroleum Company was common in several 
other tropical or semi-tropical countries such as Angola, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, 
Mexico, and Nigeria.”59 However, Aguinda v Texaco challenges such assertions by 
stating that, although Texaco had “obtained in 1971 and in 1974 patents in the U.S. on 
technological improvements for the reinjection of formation waters,” it chose to employ 
outdated and discredited methods for handling formation waters in Ecuador.60 Thus, it is 
obvious that Texaco’s decision to not employ then-modern technology in its operation in 
Ecuador was taken on a political, rather than a technological, basis. The lack of 
specification of contractor obligations in Ecuador’s legislative mechanisms, and non-
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extant regulation and enforcement of standards allowed the industry to prioritize the 
economic over the environmental bottom-line.  
 Environmental damages have also been evaluated through proxy measures. For 
example, negative impacts of substandard operating procedures on public environmental 
services have been linked to public health threats. Epidemiologist Miguel San Sebastian 
established that proximity and exposure to oil wells, contaminated groundwater and 
dumping sites causes significant increase in the incidence of miscarriage, cancer, skin 
infection and respiratory illness. San Sebastian and Córdoba also demonstrated that the 
concentration of incidences in the Oriente has resulted from degraded environmental 
services rather than a natural predisposition of local indigenous persons.61  
San Sebastian’s findings indicate that the costs of the oil industry activity are not 
evenly distributed, but rather are borne primarily by the inhabitants of the Oriente 
including colonizers and indigenous people. While both of these groups have objected to 
their poor treatment by the government and industry, indigenous protesters have enjoyed 
a notably greater amount of publicity and support for their claims. Their ethnicity-based 
proprietary claims to ancestral lands and to inherited cultural practices, including those 
linked to life in the rainforest, resonated with environmental organizations working in 
Ecuador. The latter recognized that an alliance with the former could put a human face on 
the campaign, or to frame it in terms of the violation of the basic human rights of the 
affected indigenous populations. In doing so, the international activists protesting 
Ecuador’s oil activities joined with the domestic indigenous-rights activists, facilitating 
an emerging network and shaping its character, content and organizational qualities. 
 
                                                 






This case establishes a bottom line for comparison; it is a portrait of the social and 
environmental outcomes of unconstrained state decision-making. The SOTE era can also 
be said to contain the seeds of subsequent activism by providing a value-based 
motivation and a principal strategy for organized resistance. The network emphasized its 
opposition to the state’s view of nature (specifically, the Amazon rainforest) as a space to 
be colonized, developed and subordinated to the national purpose. It also established that 
indigenous and environmental activists shared compatible values and goals.  
Activism gained momentum as information about the SOTE’s social and 
ecological impact was gathered and disseminated. For example, San Sebastian and 
Córdoba explain that  
In 1994 the Amazon Defense Front (Frente de Defensa de la Amazonía [FDA]) 
was created with the participation of numerous organizations of farmers and 
Indians and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with the objective of 
supervising the trial against Texaco. Since its formation, the group has organized 
various workshops about the environment, published accusations and reports 
about oil spills, led community information sessions and organized the visits of 
government representatives to the contaminated areas, in an attempt to open the 
eyes of the authorities to this disaster.62  
 
In its earliest stages, the campaign consistently leveraged information to galvanize 
public support. Interestingly, the state often relied on the information supplied by 
activists since it lacked the institutional and technological capacities and expertise to 
make independent assessments. Certainly, the state was not able to counter the activists’ 
claims and largely left this fight to the oil industry. The retraction of the state and 
concomitant dominance of industry in the fight over information seems to have 
                                                 




contributed to “venue shopping,” as in the filing of Aguinda v Texaco in the US court 
system. 
Also important was information, such as that provided by San Sebastian, which 
pointed to a link between environmental and social damages. This connection facilitated 
a tentative alliance between environmental and indigenous activists, with the latter group 
drawing additional support from the international human rights movement.  While 
symbiotic views on nature explain the normative basis for the interaction of these groups, 
the glue for their emerging alliance seems to have been tactical and pragmatic in nature. 
Engaging in what Keck and Sikkink refer to as “issue framing,” the alliance presented the 
environmentalists the opportunity to personalize the environmental problems by 
transferring the campaign focus from tree and plant species to innocent human victims. 
Symbolic strategies also supported this crucial step towards designing a campaign 
capable of attracting large and sympathetic audiences. It facilitated the network’s goal of 
casting the problem in dichotomous (right or wrong) terms and establishing “short causal 
links.”63  
Establishing that the object or action under protest was the creation, and remains 
the responsibility, of the targeted actor involves vilification of the target. The Ecuadorian 
case shows that, in the process of, establishing blame and responsibility, a network might 
too quickly dismiss the state’s defense of its actions. Yet this is a factor to be accounted 
for in theoretical terms, at the least, since it may constitute a sufficient counter-argument 
and thereby impact campaigners’ ability to monopolize value-based positions and to 
mobilize support. 
The Ecuadorian state’s support of the oil industry can not be readily dispensed 
                                                 




with in this analysis. That the government has steadfastly supported and promoted the oil 
industry is not surprising given that oil revenues account for a lion’s share of the GDP. In 
defense of its promotion of extractive industry, the government has emphasized the 
importance of oil revenues to national economic well-being, and coupled this fact with a 
reminder that some 70% of the total national population lives under the poverty line. As 
Lucas reports, “Ecuadorian President Gustavo Noboa has repeatedly accused the 
conservationists of obstructing a project that is essential to reviving the troubled economy 
of this Andean nation of 12.4 million, which depends on oil for over one-third of export 
revenues.”64 Essentially, the state has argued that it is obligated to guard against any 
forces that would undermine national well-being, uniquely situated to do so. This implies 
that the state faces a choice between providing for the benefit of the whole versus the 
benefit of the few, and that it must choose according to its moral obligation to the 
majority.  
This contention is difficult to counter for those who would hold the government to 
international normative standards since exactly such a ‘collective good’ argument is 
enshrined as a fundamental principle in international law. However, the network could 
have seized the opportunity to question the state’s attempt to define the national interest 
in economic terms. For example, the campaign could have asked how the state’s 
corporatist mentality would serve other collective goods such as participatory democracy, 
civil liberties, or improved public services.  
It would seem from Arsel’s account of nuclear energy activism in Turkey that this 
particular counter-defense, one that claims that the state’s policies are moral and in the 
public interest, will serve any number of governments quite well. This remains a 
                                                 




profound problem, one yet to be clarified by the literature: how does, or should, a TAN 
prioritize the rights of the few over the rights of the many? Or, how does a TAN prioritize 
some collective goods over others, and can it expect to win popular support if it 
emphasizes clean air at the expense of employment and income opportunities? Real-
world situations are not often simple, yet a TAN must, according to Keck and Sikkink, 
present to its public a right/wrong interpretation and a unified network position in order 
to create an effective frame. This is a major theoretical complication yet to be addressed 
by the proponents of the TAN perspective. 
Finally, this case both confirms and challenges a number of theoretical 
assumptions about the political characteristics of the state. For example, it underscores 
that neither democracy nor formal provision of citizen rights guarantees that a state will 
be responsive to internal pressure. This is to be expected under Keck and Sikkink’s 
formulation which holds that some degree of blockage of domestic political channels 
drives domestic actors to reach out to vertical and horizontal allies. The quality of 
democracy present within any given state can therefore be expected to affect the number 
and type of venues available to citizens who seek redress of grievances; this in turn is 
directly related to the need for a domestic activist or victim to seek international allies in 
order to exercise influence on the domestic government. However, one may object that 
simply describing a channel as ‘blocked’ is insufficient; degree of inaccessibility to, or 
repression by, the state would seem to matter for understanding both the motivation and 
the ability to actively organize. A similar line of argument is explored in the collective 
action literature by Mara Loveman who holds that, contrary to popular wisdom, 




dictatorships in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina” have shown that severe repression might 
catalyze collective action.65
The Ecuadorian case also makes clear that active membership in the international 
community of democracies does not always motivate a target to honor its international 
commitments or to react to an international “shame game.” In fact, despite mounting 
pressure from within and without, the Ecuadorian state quickened the pace of 
development of the Amazon, auctioning concession areas in violation of ILO No 169, 
and openly resorted to the application of force in order to repress network opposition.  
International condemnation grew as the government repeatedly took extreme and 
illegal action in defense of the extractive industry. For example, its military signed 
contracts with private oil companies ensuring protection of personnel, equipment and 
production activities in exchange for meals and medical care.66  Indigenous inhabitants 
protested this militarization of their traditional and titled lands, but to no avail. Therefore, 
the contractual military-industrial relationship violated Article 28 of the United Nations 
Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Groups, which states that “Military 
activities shall not take place in the lands and territories of indigenous peoples, unless 
otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned.”67  
Amnesty International reported numerous instances in which indigenous peoples 
have suffered bodily harm, kidnappings, torture and death as a result of military action on 
their lands.68 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights reprimanded the government 
for its role in these developments, and charged it to take corrective action immediately. 
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However, Amnesty International reported that Ecuador’s Minister of Mines and Energy 
responded to the injunction by saying “la OEA no manda aquí” [or, “the OAS does not 
give the orders here”] and affirming that the state’s policies would remain unchanged.69
Attempts to “shame” the state were not effective leverage tools. Ongoing 
monitoring and reporting by the international normative community did not result in hard 
consequences for the Ecuadorian government’s repeated violation of its commitments to 
international human rights norms. International obligations did not cause the state to be 
responsive to external criticism of its human rights or environmental policies and 
practices. The state cannot be said to have shown any appreciable degree of vulnerability 
to international shaming, or what Keck and Sikkink refer to as “moral leverage.”70
How then should activists assess the potential for moral leverage over the target? 
How, for example, can one judge the degree to which a state is likely to value, or 
otherwise be sensitive to, international opinion? What should be made of the fact that the 
majority of states targeted by TANs at any given moment do, in fact, maintain an array of 
economic and diplomatic relations with other international actors? Clearly, some 
differentiation between types of commitments, coupled with a contextual understanding 
of a targeted state’s international and domestic position, is required.  
Furthermore, the international system is not a static entity and changes abroad 
may alter the availability of leverage; this could be problematic for sustained campaigns. 
Pieck finds that this was a complicating factor in the case of Ecuador, since “the 
landscape of opportunities that many indigenous leaders and environmental NGOs 
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encountered in the late 1980s and early 1990s had changed by 2005.”71 How can activists 
predict, much less control, the moment at which international conditions might 
complement domestic events to increase state sensitivity and thereby yield the desired 
campaign outcome? Sikkink herself acknowledges the difficulty inherent in this exercise 
which requires that activists visualize simultaneous political opportunities at both the 
domestic and international levels. She warns against the temptation to focus on the 
opportunity structure at one level while holding the other level constant, and should 
instead view their environment as “a two-level interacting political opportunity 
structure.”72  
 This point is further illustrated by Sydney Tarrow, whose The New Transnational 
Activism describes the events that led to Pinochet’s 2004 indictment for human rights 
crimes. Chilean exiles collaborated with British and Spanish authorities, rather than the 
reluctant Chilean state, to arrange for Pinochet’s first interrogation in Spanish courts. The 
2004 ruling against Pinochet eventually encouraged the Chilean state to reverse policy 
and pursue the prosecution of a number of junta leaders, producing what Tarrow refers to 
as a domestic “justice cascade.”73 However, the author contends that this outcome 
resulted from the serendipitous, rather than strategic, combination of a number of 
delicate, time-sensitive and complex international and domestic events. As emphasized 
by Tarrow: “international opportunities seldom come together as fortuitously as they did 
in the Pinochet case.”74   
What is clear with regards to this matter is that greater specification of terms and 
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conditions is needed. As the Ecuadorian case suggests, it is unwise to anticipate state 
decision-making based on, for example, the classification of a target state as “democratic 
or not.” Static conceptions, presented without referents, are not theoretically meaningful 
to the scholar or practically useful to the activist. It is a generally accepted notion that the 
term “democratic” can refer to any number of policy constellations, as the political 
science literature concerned with subtypes and adjectivization of democracy well 
illustrates. Furthermore, a democratic state, however specified, should not be expected to 
function as a uniformly democratic entity. Rather, all states display gradations of 
democratic tendencies that vary according to any number of factors, including: the nature 
of the relevant issue area, events in international or national politics and relations, the 
need for favorable access to the international market, etc. Promising work on this concept 
has recently emerged from both the activist and the scholarly communities. For example, 
Transparency International, an organization that pursues an anti-corruption agenda, 
publishes a Bribe Payers Index (BPI) that ranks the frequency of incidences of corruption 
by both country and industry, a tool of great practical value to activists who seek to 
predict the receptivity of a target state on a given issue. Terry Karl finds that over-
reliance on petroleum exportation causes petro-states to follow a specific institutional and 
political trajectory, regardless of their domestic mode of governance or international 
commitments. Generally, these and similar efforts support the notion that greater 














Actors and Institutional Capacity.   
 
 In 1989, CEPE was reorganized as Petroecuador, and became sole operator of 
SOTE. Informal negotiations for the OCP began during the same year. The original OCP 
Consortium was comprised of Alberta Energy, Kerr McGee, Occidental Petroleum, 
AGIP, Perez Companc, Repsol-YPF and Techint.75  
In 1992, Ecuador withdrew from OPEC, in preparation for the augmentation of its 
production capacity. Although a series of expansions had increased the carrying capacity 
of the SOTE to some 390,000 barrels per day, transport capacity reportedly fell short of 
production potentials; the new pipeline promised a capacity of 450,000 barrels per day, 
more than doubling Ecuador’s output.76
The OCP project was associated with a trend towards external and institutional 
involvement in the effort to assess the project’s potential impacts; this was a departure 
from the agential nature of discovery and information dissemination of the SOTE era. 
One reason for this shift was the difference in project scope, and thereby in potential 
impact. Also important was the increasingly salient issue of liability for negative 
environmental impact.  
Until the mid 1990s, the state consistently dealt with negative environmental 
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impact through informal and case-specific arrangements. In the few instances in which 
the state imposed environmental standards on the hydrocarbon industry, it did so through 
arrangements with individual companies rather than through wholesale adjustments of its 
legislation or the strengthening of its institutional enforcement capability. For example, 
the 1993 filing of Aguinda v Texaco prompted Texaco and the state to reach an 
agreement for the remediation of Texpet’s negative environmental impact. Announced in 
1995, the settlement cost Texaco a mere $40 million, obligated the company to cleanup 
only 156 of its 627 unlined toxic waste pits, and provided the company a pretext for the 
renewal of  its motion to dismiss Aguinda v Texaco.77 The government certified Texpet’s 
remediation in 1998 and thereby released the company from future liability. However, the 
state neglected to subsequently update its environmental standards through legislative or 
regulatory means, allowing instead for the continuation of those same laws that had 
permitted Texpet’s disastrous environmental practices. 
A final reason for the institutional character of the OCP debate was the growing 
influence of non-governmental organizations. Beginning in the 1980s, non-domestic 
organizations representing social, political and scientific concerns established a presence 
in Ecuador. In the 1990s, indigenous rights and environmental organizations formed 
transnational alliances, resulting in expanded access to non-state intellectual and financial 
resources, and providing support for the creation and development of domestic 
counterparts. The domestic indigenous and environmental groups relied heavily on the 
technical, scientific, legal, and financial support of their international and regional 
counterparts.  
 While the majority of the international organizations engaged in sustained action 
                                                 




over time, the occasional star has also appeared; in 2002, Julia Butterfly Hill joined 
activists in the Mindo Cloudforest for Ecuador’s maiden tree-sit in protest against the 
government’s approval for the routing of the OCP through the protected Mindo area. 
Such incidents aided in broadcasting the debate to the international arena. The interest 
generated abroad was particularly important to environmental policy evaluation since it 
expanded the epistemic community, or regime united in cohesive discourse, to include 
respected scientists whose research contributions reduced scientific uncertainty regarding 
the environmental effects of hydrocarbon activity. Significantly, this community 
produced the most thorough, and sometimes the only, EIAs of pipeline designs, siting 
decisions, and emergency response and mitigation policies.  
 One example is the contribution of The Mindo Working Group (MWG) to the 
debate over the siting of the pipeline. The OCP was largely designed to parallel the route 
of the SOTE, thereby containing invasive construction and maximizing knowledge about 
the potential problems of the OCP route. However, the state aggressively promoted a 
northern diversion of the OCP for a 100-mile stretch near Quito that would slice through 
the famously pristine and ecologically diverse Mindo National Cloudforest. The MWG 
found that the EIA for this “northern route” did not account for potential cumulative 
impacts, including:78
- Encroaching cultivation 
- Encroaching pastures 
- Wood extraction for lumber and firewood 
- Species (e.g., frogs) extinction in the Mindo region 
- Increased forest fragmentation 
- Noise related to pipeline construction 
- Environmental degradation of the Mindo IBA 
- Degradation of the water quality of the hydrographic basins 
- Reduction in economic benefits 
                                                 




In a second example, additional concern over the Mindo route was voiced in a 
December 2001 letter from high-level World Bank officials that insisted the OCP 
consortium retract its unsubstantiated claim that the pipeline project was in compliance 
with World Bank standards. The letter was followed by perhaps the best example of 
influential, non-domestic evaluations of the OCP project: the 2002 report of the findings 
of Robert Goodland’s Environmental and Social Impact Evaluations (EIA and SIA, or 
Social Impact Evaluation) of the OCP project.   
Goodland, chief of the Environment Department of the World Bank for 25 years 
until his retirement in 2001, visited Ecuador in 2002 to complete the study that was 
“initiated by the German NGOs "Rettet den Regenwald" and "Urgewald” and supported 
by Greenpeace, the Institute Suedwind as well as several US and Italian NGOs and the 
three biggest Italian labor unions.”79 In his report, Goodland accused the OCP consortium 
of substantial non-compliance with World Bank environmental and social criteria, 
namely Natural Habitats, Involuntary Resettlement, Environmental Assessment, and 
Indigenous Peoples. Goodland further confirmed that the alternative pipeline route 
promoted by activists was environmentally superior to the route (through the Mindo 
Cloudforest and the GEF’s Choco-Andean Corridor) already approved by the state.80
Neither the World Bank nor Goodland was able to convince the state to 
reconsider the Mindo route. However, Goodland’s condemnation of the pipeline project 
did cause Germany’s largest publicly-owned bank, Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB), 
to withdraw as the lead arranger of the original 17-year, $900 million OCP syndicated 
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bank loan.81 Following the release of the Goodland report, network activists in Germany 
charged public officials, including the Prime Minister, from the German federal state of 
Nordhein-Westfalen (the bank’s principal shareholder) with complicity.82 In 
Parliamentary hearings on the subject, Germany’s influential Green Party joined with 
NGOs in insisting that the WestLB honor the terms of its lending policy which required 
project compliance with World Bank environmental guidelines.83 Although the pipeline 
was by then largely completed, the WestLB withdrew completely.  
 In contrast to the trends towards specialization and diversification of knowledge 
through increasing foreign and substate institutional involvement, the state continued to 
centralize decision-making and to undermine environmental initiatives. The short-lived 
independence of DIGEMA followed this trend. In 1988, this agency began a campaign to 
strengthen hydrocarbon industry regulation. During this period, Conoco submitted 
Ecuador’s first (if incomplete) EIA to DIGEMA.84 Article 31 of the 1990 Ley de 
Hidrocarburos [Hydrocarbon Law] reasserted that private and state-owned oil companies 
must submit detailed EIAs addressing all phases of operation. Yet, even as its 
responsibilities were reiterated, the DIGEMA was gutted and its responsibilities and 
resources were transferred to the Dirección Nacional del Medio Ambiente [National 
Directorate of the Environment, or DINAMA]. Both of these agencies were controlled by 
the new Subsecretaria de Medio Ambiente [Subsecretary of the Environment, or SMA], 
which was itself under the auspices of the MEM. Kimerling reports on the structural 
implication of the reorganization, stating that: the 1990 annual budget for the SMA was 
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$10,000; its four personnel were responsible for all of the extractive activities throughout 
the country; and none of the four was hired as a field-based compliance inspector.85   
Not surprisingly, DINAMA’s mandate to protect the environment was 
subordinated to the MEM’s mandate to promote extractive industry activity. In 1990, the 
MEM developed a “gentleman’s agreement” between the industry and the government, 
effectively bypassing the DINAMA. The Acta de compromiso para observer las 
disposiciones de manejo ambiental para las actividades hidrocarburíferas [Compromise 
Agreement for observing the environmental management rules for hydrocarbon 
activities] stated that industry compliance with environmental standards would be 
undertaken on a voluntary basis through 1992, at which time the issues of monitoring and 
enforcement would be revisited.86
Velasco succinctly describes the centralization of the bureaucratic structure as it 
was until 1995. He explains that the MEM’s SMA handled all development and 
regulation of sub-surface resources. The SMA had at its disposal three MEM agencies, 
which retained the following mandates: DINAMI (National Directorate of Mining) 
granted concession, exploitation and exploration permits; DINAMA (National 
Directorate of Environment) was primarily concerned with the environmental dimensions 
of resource development, received EIAs and was responsible for all monitoring, 
enforcement, etc.; and CODIGEM (Corporation for Geological-Mining-Metallurgical 
Research and Development) provided technical assistance to miners, and supported 
research and development.87
In 1995, a $14 million World Bank loan to Ecuador’s established the Mining 
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Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project. The Project 
Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of 2003 found that institutional capacity was 
greatly undermined as a result of the bureaucratic structure, as described by Velasco. The 
World Bank noted that the centralization of decision-making and the existence of internal 
conflicting mandates were particularly troublesome. The PPAR concluded that: 
When most environmental responsibilities are delegated to a sector ministry, as in 
Ecuador, it is important to reduce potential internal conflicts of interest between 
the sector ministry’s roles as investment promoter and environmental control and 
enforcement agency, by clearly separating the responsibility for these functions. 
Furthermore, sector oversight capacity also needs to be built up within the 
Ministry of the Environment, and support of local communities needs to be 
secured.88  
 
 A 1996 executive decree created the Ministerio de Medio Ambiente [Ministry of 
the Environment, or MMA]. In 1997, the MMA began to act on its mandate: “gestor, 
asesor, promotor, concertador y ejecutor de las políticas ambientales” [facilitator, 
assessor, promoter, coordinator and executor of environmental issues].89 In 1997, the 
state’s Agenda 21 report cast the creation of this multi-purpose agency as a move towards 
“integrated decision-making.”90 In the same report, the state noted that its MEM funding 
had benefited from increased support from USAID and UNDP, but declined to declare its 
actual budget.  
 
 
Social and Environmental Impacts.   
 Data for the amounts of crude spilled from the OCP are unavailable. However, 
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Weemaels provides information about spillage impacts on local residents that can be 
treated as a proxy measure of spillage; although they are not quantitative, her findings 
demonstrate that spillage events have been consistent and widespread. Weemaels reports 
that Acción Ecológica’s independent EIA of pipeline impacts through March 2002 
contains data collected through interviews with the thousands of people living in the 
direct path of the OCP. These data indicate that, of the total number interviewed, 89% 
lost crops and 15% lost farm animals as a result of oil spillage from leeches or ruptures in 
the OCP. An additional 19% reported the loss of infrastructure, such as fencing, 
roadways or pasture, as a result of the siting and a destructive construction process.91  
Furthermore, soil erosion resulting from the deforestation of the OCP route and access 
roads caused severe flooding.  Weemaels estimates the total damage suffered by 
interview respondents at $1,299,390.92  
 Weemaels also notes those environmental impact costs that are not easily 
quantified in economic terms. For example, the EIA recorded contamination of drinking 
water in 157 water reserves, streams and wells. Weemaels claims that each instance of 
contamination was the result of “inadequate technology, negligence of the workers and 
lack of available funds for mitigation of the impacts.”93 Weemaels also includes data on 
the loss of flora and fauna and of various animal species. Finally, Weemaels writes of 
“extensive evidence that a pre-determined plan was lacking, and that instead, decisions 
were being made along the way.”94 In support of this observation, she cites large 
campsites within protected areas, two roads not included in the EIA originally submitted 
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by Technit, and evidence of advanced construction directly over a fault line.   
 This last observation points to the need to make unapproved and unsupervised 
adjustments in response to unexpected physical realities. This is a reality of the 
construction process that is not accounted for in EIAs or other forms of preliminary 
planning, despite the fact that many design and construction companies acknowledge this 
as a legitimate and routine occurrence. For example, Hydroconsult, an engineering firm 
hired to consult on the OCP design for river navigation, acknowledges making ad-hoc 
adjustments to the OCP river route, as new information and conditions necessitated. The 
state did not oversee the construction process, essentially devolving responsibility to 
private companies. 
 Other secondary impacts noted by Weemaels have been addressed by the state 
and industry, although not necessarily in a manner acceptable to the TAN. For example, 
the Fundación Jatun Sacha was subcontracted by the OCP Consortium to direct its 
Proyecto Revegetación [Revegetation Project]. The Fundación collected information 
about the areas to be destroyed by OCP construction, and grew vegetation indigenous to 
these areas in greenhouses for later replanting.95 This strategy can neither repair damage 
to the ecosystem and the environmental services it supports nor pretend to account for all 
of the plant and animal species that will be endangered or driven into extinction; yet, this 
remediation was surely an unprecedented nod in the direction of conservationists, 
whatever its purpose or design. 
  Among the more notable TAN successes was its effect on state policy providing 
for the protection of Yasuní National Park. Scientists Concerned for Yasuní (SCY) 
learned from satellite imagery in 2005 that Petrobras had begun construction on an illegal 
                                                 




access road in the buffer zone (of primary forest) of the Yasuní National Park. The SCY’s 
alarm at the prospect of a Yasuní access road was motivated by environmental concerns, 
like logging, that transcend the immediate impact of the road itself. Yasuní is a nationally 
protected area, an UNESCO BioSphere and the earth’s most biodiverse forest.96 Finer 
sounded the alarm to the international community and claimed that it ought to oppose the 
road since it would “transect the territory of the Chiru Isla Quichua community living 
along the Rio Napo, and would enter the ancestral territory of the Huaorani, possibly 
even impacting an uncontacted community.”97 SCY’s letter-writing campaign to protect 
the roadless integrity of Yasuní achieved positive results under the recently-instated 
President Alfredo Palacio and his appointee, Environment Minister Anita Alban. Acting 
on information provided by SCY, Alban notified Petrobras in 2005 that it did not have 
governmental authorization to construct the road. Alan cited “the lack of consideration of 
access alternatives that would minimize impact.”98 In response, Petrobras sued the state 
for access; the lawsuit was rejected by the courts and Petrobras agreed in 2006 to adopt 
SCY’s recommendation to access its concession within Yasuní by helicopter.  
 Despite this small success, the state has generally supported policies that have 
significant secondary environmental impact. It became a member of the World Trade 
Organization in 1996 with hopes of attracting private foreign investment and expanding 
export markets.99 In further preparation for increased oil production, the state, acting 
through CEPE, initiated three rounds of bidding for permits to newly established 
concession areas. Although all of these concessions were, at least partially, within 
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protected biodiverse areas, the state maintained that its constitutional right to subsurface 
resources enjoyed legal priority over environmental considerations.  
 Such controversial state policy might have been facilitated by continuing attacks 
on the validity of linkages between indirect environmental and human health impacts 
resulting from hydrocarbon activity. For example, while Texaco does not deny its 
environmental practices, as they are outlined in Aguinda v Texaco, the company holds 
that there exists no proven link between its practices and the negative impacts on human 
and environmental health. Texaco also mobilized an epistemic community in support of 
its position, but this strategy backfired when it was revealed that health workers from 
many countries had “signed a statement excoriating Chevron for buying full-page ads in 
Ecuador's major newspapers, in which paid scientific consultants cast doubts on studies 
linking oil development to adverse health effects in the Amazon.”100   
 The World Bank recently implemented the Environmental Management Technical 
Assistance Project (PATRA), which aims to support the MEM in developing “detailed 
environmental procedures, criteria, limits, and EIA guidelines for the petroleum sector” 
and strengthening its environmental assessment capacities.101  
 This effort to specify and codify policy is a step in the right direction, although it 
is a retroactive policy as far as the OCP campaign is concerned. In the end, it would seem 
that OCP campaign did appear to enjoy some success in its efforts to influence the 
dialogue about the pipeline project. However, on closer examination, few of its 
accomplishments are concrete gains. In fact, revegetation projects and other similar 
projects flowing from the state and the industry could be interpreted as aggressive efforts 
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to co-opt the language of the network, thereby deflecting criticism and neutralizing the 




The TAN was in a position of strength at the beginning of the OCP debate. 
Recalling Keck and Sikkink’s independent variables, it can be said that the OCP 
campaign enjoyed extraordinary advantages: broad horizontal links, an enormous virtual 
audience, important international allies, effective framing and so on. However, a 
scrupulous application of the authors’ approach requires mention of the internal 
challenges to network cohesion, and a faithful critique of Keck and Sikkink’s formulation 
begs a discussion of the authors’ limited portrait of TAN actors and their relationships. 
The authors treat TAN actors in static terms: they are either international or 
national, either fully collaborating or not. Empirical findings from the Ecuadorian TAN 
case show that this leaves much to be desired. For example, what role was played by an 
organization known as COICA (Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the 
Amazon Basin)? Created in 1992 by a number of indigenous movements from nine South 
American countries, and aimed at promoting indigenous claims to land and autonomy, 
COICA was an international-level actor during the OCP era. As such, it represented a 
number of national movements that were variously integrated in their respective domestic 
political landscapes, and interacted directly with actors at both national and international 
circuits. It is not clear how this entity fits into Keck and Sikkink’s conceptual map of 




activism, and since COICA, as an organization, interacted with both TAN actors from the 
national and international level.  
The horizontal and vertical interactions of COICA were important to its role in 
the creation of the Ecuadorian TAN. In its structure and stated goals, the organization 
represented national-level actors who championed indigenous rights. In this capacity, it 
was the creator and catalyst of a new campaign strategy that was quickly adopted on a 
global level; COICA was the first entity to publicly call for and achieve progress towards 
the strategic marriage of indigenous rights and conservationist campaigns.102 In a 1989 
letter addressed “To the Community of Concerned Environmentalists,” COICA stated 
that indigenous peoples of the Amazon and environmental activists were natural allies, as 
both sought to preserve the Amazonian rainforest. The letter called for collaboration in 
order to “guarantee the future of the Amazon Basin, not only for our peoples, but also for 
humanity.”103  
The letter and its declarations, commonly known as the Two Agendas, launched a 
new partnership and activist campaign strategy.  The collaboration was formalized in 
May of 1990 when COICA hosted the First Amazon Summit Meeting Between 
Indigenous Peoples and Environmentalists, which concluded with the signing of the 
Declaration of Iquitos.104 In the following decade, numerous strategies for effective 
collaboration were published and discussed by both actors, and the support of the donors 
- then mostly private foundations and some multilateral agencies - was secured. It seemed 
then that, as stated in the World Wildlife Federation’s 1996 Principles and Guidelines on 
Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas, “there is no inherent conflict 
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between the objectives of conservationists and indigenous peoples.”105  
Challenging such statements are several high-profile, intra-network disputes that 
point to some degree of organizational and ideological incoherence within the TAN. The 
problems inherent in attempting to fuse distinct goals were exemplified by the 
international non-governmental organization (INGO) scandal of 1990 in which 
  
representatives of two U.S.-based non-governmental organizations, the National 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Cultural Survival, met in secret with 
representatives of Conoco, in an effort to work out a compromise solution that 
would allow Conoco to proceed with exploration while providing some protection 
for the environment.106  
 
These organizations promoted their own pragmatic agendas. Since they were 
convinced that that oil extraction was destined to continue it seemed prudent to 
collaborate with industry actors in order to gain some control over the environmental 
outcomes. What they proposed was a trade of sorts: in return for the ‘green stamp’ that 
Conoco sought from the NRDC, the company would establish a conservation fund that 
would be placed under the management of Conoco and the “independent policy makers, 
nominated by NRDC, Conoco, and other participating groups.”107 In addition, the NRDC 
representatives offered a survey of the positions that they suspected the other 
environmental NGOs and INGOs might adopt in response to the Conoco compromise, 
and strategized about how best to soften opposition and manufacture support.  
The content of this meeting was leaked to the international community and a 
significant fall-out followed. Many indigenous network activists, who focused their 
efforts on securing a moratorium on oil development activity rather than simply 
                                                 
105 Chapin, 20. 
106 Benjamin and Turner, 3. 




managing environmental impact, felt betrayed.108 In an ironic twist, the bad press 
prompted Conoco to withdraw completely from Ecuador; of course, the void created by 
its departure was soon filled by another oil company, Maxus, which was less interested to 
committing itself to environmental management compromises.109 The end result 
constituted a net loss for all of the Ecuadorian TAN activists.  
Clearly, actors from the environmental and human/indigenous rights arenas 
brought to the campaign a number of compatible yet distinct concerns. Despite on-going 
collaboration, the strategies of the two activist groups occasionally reflected ideological 
differences, sometimes to the detriment of collective efforts and campaign efficiency. 
Were these difficulties fatal to campaign outcome? Although Keck and Sikkink’s writing 
does not indicate how the degree to which internal problems might impact network goals 
can be assessed, they do emphasize the importance of the public’s perception of network 
activists. In fact, the criteria ‘transparent relationships among activists’ is included in one 
of their independent variables. Is it possible that the network’s internal fissures were to 
blame for the negative outcome of the OCP campaign? Was this episode but one instance 
in the long history of the Ecuadorian TAN or should it be interpreted as a symptom of the 
network’s internal weakness?  
Moving beyond the specifics of the Ecuadorian case, Mato provides us with good 
reason to always investigate the goals of the INGOs involved in any TAN. He explains 
that the funding matters, since it causes INGOs to become dependent on the state that 
supports their existence and thereby creates incentives for them to represent their 
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sponsor’s concerns.110 Similarly, Chapin reports that INGO loyalties, goals and strategies 
vary with shifts in funding sources. He finds that, since the 1990s, private donors and 
foundations have been displaced by corporate and bilateral or multilateral agencies as the 
principal sources of INGO funding. This is most true for “the Big Three,” as Chapin 
refers to them: The Nature Conservancy, World Wildlife Federation, and Conservancy 
International.111 Concomitant to the change in funding sources was a “strategic shift” in 
INGO behavior; increasingly, large INGOs are territorial and antagonistic in their 
dealings with one another, dismissive of their Third-World “partners,” and given to 
compromise with their donors.112  
Chapin notes that the previous efforts to collaborate with affected indigenous 
peoples, were also abandoned in the course of this restructuring of priorities and funding, 
as conservationist organizations realized that it was not in their financial interests to 
support indigenous strategies of resistance, which were often economically disruptive and 
physically violent in nature and frequently aimed at the organizations’ “funding 
partners.”113 In justifying their decisions to disconnect from the indigenous rights 
campaigns in favor of maintaining supposedly “apolitical” positions, the Big Three have 
issued statements that call into question the wisdom of their previous efforts to promote 
“native stewardship,” arguing instead that “once indigenous peoples are given tenure to 
their lands, there is no assurance that they will work to conserve their biodiversity.”114 In 
and beyond Ecuador, the dual-issue campaign uniting indigenous and environmentalist 
activists is fragile; yet in Ecuador it did not break down, but instead was reconfigured 
                                                 
110 Mato, 23. 
111 Chapin, 22-23. 
112 Chapin, 25. 
113 Chapin, 26. 




along ideological lines.  
Furthermore, despite internal problems, it was certainly during the OCP era that 
the network was seemingly at its largest and most dense, and therefore in its most 
powerful position relative to the target state. In 2003, Martin found that there were “over 
200 NGOs (national and transnational) working in the Ecuadorian Amazon …”115 Of 
course, only provisional conclusions can be drawn from such data under the formulation 
of Keck and Sikkink. Taken together, network density and size constitute the fourth of 
Keck and Sikkink’s independent variables affecting campaign outcome. Of all the 
elements of the authors’ TAN theory, this is by far the most unspecified. The authors do 
not contextualize either term, leaving the reader to wonder what constitutes a ‘large’ or 
‘dense’ network. Keck and Sikkink also do not establish a threshold of sufficiency for 
either concept. Therefore, while it is easy to claim that the Ecuadorian TAN was at its 
largest during the OCP era or to count INGOs, it is not possible to apply Keck and 
Sikkink’s formulation to establish whether the TAN was sufficiently large or dense to 
influence the campaign outcome. Methodologically speaking, these terms pose a great 
challenge to a case study application of Keck and Sikkink’s formulation.  
Density relates to the ties that exist between members of any single TAN.  
However, it is unclear which types of ‘ties’ are necessary or sufficient or both for 
effective campaigning. The scholarly community has reacted quite strongly to the use of 
this slippery terminology, particularly as it is used to describe an independent variable. 
The most common critique holds that it is necessary for theoretical purposes to specify 
the numbers and qualities of these ties. For example, Tarrow and McAdam find that the 
nature of ties within a network determines the manner in which a campaign is projected 
                                                 




from the domestic sphere into the transnational arena. They find that there are two 
distinct paths that this projection, or “scale shift” can occur, following from two 
mechanisms of projection that the authors refer to as relational diffusion and brokerage. 
The former involves the  
transfer of information along established lines of interaction, while brokerage 
entails information transfers that depend on the linking of two or more previously 
unconnected social sites. We argue that while diffusion is the more common route 
because it uses existing identities and ties and facilitates emulation, when borders 
are to be crossed and distant social actors brought together, brokerage is the more 
likely mechanism . . . .116  
 
Thus, the authors emphasize that the presence or absence of existing ties within a 
network can impact the manner in which a campaign is made transnational. This is of 
significance for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that Tarrow and McAdam 
find a correlation between the route taken to the transnational arena and the outcome of 
network activism.117  
Tarrow and McAdam also briefly mention a variant of the first mechanism, one 
they call non-relational diffusion, meaning “the transfer of information by means of 
impersonal carriers, such as the mass media.”118 They explain that, while they think that 
such a pathway is a “common and important component of scale shift that has been 
woefully understudied by movement scholars,” they decline to discuss it since their 
research program concerns the way in which “movement actors facilitate scale shift.”119  
This is unfortunate since mass media, particularly the internet, was extremely important 
to the development of the OCP campaign.  
                                                 
116 Tarrow and McAdam, 145-6. 
117 Tarrow and McAdam, 145. 
118 Tarrow and McAdam, 127. 




Lance Bennett cautions against theories of network density and organization that 
do not factor in the use of “social technologies” like widely available open source 
applications on the internet. In contrast to Tarrow and McAdam’s conceptualization of an 
impersonal mass media, Bennett writes that the term social technology indicates that it is 
not only the technology itself, but also its social dimensions that together facilitate scale 
shift.120 Bennett finds that virtual networks are in fact more personal and better defined 
by interpersonal ties than are the traditional NGO-based networks. He supports this 
argument by stating that virtual networks are less centralized, and therefore more reliant 
on the individual activist; this means that there is less need to censor radical opinions in 
order to allow an organization to present a moderate, public-friendly image. Bennett also 
makes the excellent point that the persons who have contributed the most to the 
development of alternative mass media are also likely those who were “least likely to 
have a voice in conventional media channels.”121 Since virtual networks do not require 
network ties with traditional mass media formats, but only the technological capability to 
mount an internet campaign, it appears that there is a need to theoretically redefine the 
value of network density or, at the least, to explore whether strategic ties, for example to 
the conventional mass media, are inclusive or exclusive forces within networks.   
Clearly, Bennett does not view the internet as yet another activist tool, having the 
same theoretical value as other mass media. In fact, he finds that, “more than amplifying 
the mobilizing capacities of organizations, application of social technologies are 
beginning to transform organizational forms,” integrating so-called hyper-organizations, 
or internet-based networks, with the more traditional forms described by Keck and 
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Sikkink.122 In essence, he advocates for a new theory of transnational activism that 
accounts for the intersection of these two groups, and for the possibility that such 
interaction will produce a hybrid organization that is, in practice and in theory, an unique 
entity.    
  The debate over organizational definition and form is actually concerned with 
best to maximize density in order to achieve access to the international system: via a 
decentralized virtual network, the loose and fluid network described by Keck and 
Sikkink, a strictly institutionalized framework, or some combination thereof? Keck and 
Sikkink envisioned an organizational structure allowing for fluid relationships between 
NGOs and INGOs of all sizes. Rather than developing institutionalized patterns of 
interaction, these network actors would collaborate on an as-needed basis, depending on 
the issue at hand. They write that “despite the differences between domestic and 
international realms, the network concept travels well because it stresses fluid and open 
relationships among committed and knowledgeable actors . . .”123 Quoting Walter Powell, 
an organizational theorist, the authors claim that “networks are ‘lighter on their feet’ than 
hierarchy.”124  
Several arguments in favor of institutionalized relationships have surfaced in 
counter to this claim. Most of these hold that institutions are more efficient than loose 
networks since institutionalization enhances a network’s access to the international 
system. This access facilitates the flow of resources and information, providing a 
mechanism for inter-network disputes, enhancing network legitimacy and ensuring its 
inclusivity, and reducing the effects of asymmetrical power relationships among network 
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actors. Reduction of transaction costs is obviously important to the longevity and success 
rate of network activism. Also interesting is the suggestion that network might benefit 
from providing channels for democratic conflict resolution. Recalling earlier discussion, 
it is clear that Keck and Sikkink have adopted a limited and somewhat rosy 
characterization of network activists and their relationships; channels for intra-network 
dispute resolution might contribute to the success rates of TAN campaigns by enhancing 
legitimacy and transparency. 
Advocating for the benefits of the de-centralized virtual network, Bennett predicts 
that both traditional NGO-centered and virtual networks will oppose the trend towards 
hybrid organizing. As he describes it, the conflict centers around which of the favored 
organizational forms, centralized or not, ought to dominate, and how the ideological and 
theoretical differences between these forms translate into real and practical dilemmas for 
network members.125 For example, a centralized, NGO-based approach draws heavily on 
institutional channels in order to achieve favorable terms of access to the international 
system, while the virtual networks create new, untapped channels of access, combining 
the benefits of large membership with complete flexibility. Such a network is associated 
with the additional benefit of computer-supported network measurement capabilities. 
Software designed to measure various qualities of virtual social networks has proliferated 
as internet-based networking sites have grown in popularity. Application of these 
methodological tools might enhance the usefulness formulation of Keck and Sikkink’s 
fourth independent variable.  
In addition to its hybrid traditional-virtual form, the OCP campaign was also 
innovative in its approach to the idea of “material leverage.”  Interestingly, it would seem 
                                                 




that the OCP TAN had the greatest impact on state policy making where it was able to 
create a new form of material leverage, rather than relying on traditional sources provided 
by pre-existing international actors. For example, the Ecuadorian case suggests that it 
might be theoretically useful to investigate the seeming emergence of “boomerang 
patterns” that involve domestic, foreign and international courts. In the case of Ecuador, 
this pattern is demonstrated by the filing of Aguinda v Texaco in New York; this court’s 
eventual decision that the case should be heard in Ecuador; and a subsequent rush of 
transnational activism to promote the transparency, independence and authority of the 
suddenly famous and certainly overwhelmed Ecuadorian court in Lago Agrio. As Kolker 
describes it, Aguinda v Texaco represents a “pioneering new paradigm of exporting 
American-style environmental class actions.”126
Interestingly, the campaign’s innovative, court-based actions led indirectly to 
policy changes by the Ecuadorian government. During the 1990s, liability issues raised in 
the course of the initial hearings of Aguinda v Texaco prompted the state to supplement 
informal arrangements with formal mechanisms. Thus, the1994 decree Políticas 
Ambientales Básicas del Ecuador [Basic Environmental Policies in Ecuador] introduced 
the idea that foreign companies ought to “apply the highest standards and requirements of 
their home country in their operations in Ecuador, without prejudice to compliance with 
Ecuadorian law.”127  
The state was further galvanized by the specter of liability when it was proved 
that the1998 issuance of remediation certification to Texaco was based on fraudulent soil 
samples provided by the company. A flurry of lawsuits followed: the state maintained 
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that this evidence annulled Texaco’s release from liability, while Texaco pointed out that 
the state had approved its method of sampling and its analysis of the results. At stake in 
this on-going legal tug-of-war is the assignment of responsibility for the social and 
environmental damages alleged in Aguinda v Texaco. It is entirely possible that the state, 
through its enabling policies and the low social and environmental standards of the state-
run CEPE, might eventually be punished for ignoring the demands of the OCP campaign.  
The potential leverage of class-action torts is significant. The current price tag 
attached to Aguinda v Texaco stands at $6.1 billion, yet this suit only addresses damages 
sustained by 30,000 indigenous people from a few of tribes. Depending on the outcome 
of this suit, the threat of new class action suits could constitute a significant leverage. 
Thomasson emphasizes the potential scope of the liability issue, stating that: 
Jota, et. al. v Texaco, another class action suit on behalf of 25,000 Peruvians, was 
filed a few days after the Aguinda litigation had commenced. . . .The Jota plaintiffs claim 
that Texaco’s oil operations in Ecuador also have had an impact in Peru. The Center for 
Economic and Social Rights, an NGO based in New York, has found that oil-related 
contamination flowed into Peru via the rivers common to the two countries.128
 
This suit illustrates that not only do environmental problems ignore political 
boundaries, but any associated liability might also cross borders. Increasingly, indications 
abound that creating leverage through creative applications of international law might 
constitute a new TAN strategy. Amazon Watch reports that “other companies recently 
targeted by "class action style" environmental litigation in Latin America include Dole 
Food, Shell Oil, Dow Chemical, Occidental Chemical, Del Monte Fresh Produce and 
Chiquita Brands International.”129 Watts also acknowledges this emerging trend, noting 
that “Earthrights International, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), brought charges 
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against Unocal arguing that the Yadama pipeline had led to extensive human rights 
abuses, specifically rape, death, and the disruption of a local way of life. . . . These 
clashes between a global oil industry and a vast transnational human rights advocacy 
network have become increasingly commonplace.”130  
However, the success of these manufactured forms of leverage is as yet debatable. 
For example, the Ecuadorian state demanded that its contract for the construction of the 
OCP include a “guarantee payment of all environmental liabilities caused by the pipeline 
up to a maximum of $50 million.”131 The OCP Ltd. is also reported to have obtained a 
provision in its contract with the Ecuadorian government for three separate insurance 
policies, including “An Environmental Damage insurance policy, which covers all 
environmental damages resulting from the construction or operation of the pipeline.”132  
These measures, establishing and limiting liability, can be seen as a reaction to the 
potential liability of the SOTE era. However, they clearly prioritize state and industry 
concerns about environmental damage over those of the TAN; this outcome cautions 
against the tendency to assume that learning on the part of the target state will promote a 
convergence towards a single norm. In the case of Ecuador, the learning process simply 
alerted the target to its Achilles’ heal and thereby enabled the continuation of its 
offensive behavior.  The value of a reactive, legalistic and punitive action strategy is 
questionable, and possibly as likely to benefit as to deter the target. 
 In spite of such grim warnings, the prospect of creating new forms of leverage 
grows ever more tantalizing as traditional leverage increasingly fails to produce 
meaningful outcomes. The most obvious example of the OCP campaign’s use of 
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traditional material leverage was the Goodland Report which supported the World Bank’s 
position and caused the WestLB to withdraw its support. This outcome follows perfectly 
the boomerang pattern described by Keck and Sikkink: network actors petitioned an actor 
from the international scene for assistance, and then used the information generated by 
this process to pressure the financial institution (via implicated politicians) to honor its 
public commitment to not bankroll infrastructure projects that did not meet World Bank 
environmental and social standards.  
However, this event is most accurately thought of as a single battle won in the 
course of a war; it had little secondary impact on other actors or their policies. The reality 
of the international system and the global political economy in particular is that, while it 
allows for the simultaneous existence of multiple norms, it favors those orientations that 
prioritize capital accumulation. Acknowledging this structural complexity, it is hardly 
surprising that the financial impact of WestLB’s departure was easily absorbed by the 
Consortium and its financial backers who remained beyond the influence of the TAN’s 
demands. To underscore this point, it is worth examining how project financiers were 
able to operate freely, safely removed from the arena of contention, even as their OCP 
project was heavily criticized.  
According to Van Gelder, the OCP project was funded through a combination of 
corporate equity and debt financing. The OCP Ltd. contributed US 400 million, or 31% 
of the project costs; this was the parent company of OCP Ecuador S.A., the builder of the 
pipeline, which included corporate shareholders from seven different countries and was 
registered in the Cayman Islands.133 The remainder of the project cost, $900 million, was 
secured through loans from “a group of 16 financial institutions from eight countries” 
                                                 




including nine banks and seven pension funds and insurance companies.134 In order to 
reduce investment risk, the financiers established contractual relationships with the OCP 
Consortium oil companies; the latter were made to sign 20-year “ship-or-pay” contracts 
guaranteeing payment to OCP Ltd. for a specified percentage of pipeline volume capacity 
regardless of actual production or transportation rates. The fact that all of these actors are 
transnational companies that originate or are based in a dozen countries complicates the 
advocacy network’s task.  
The financial web, and consequently the network’s challenge, is further 
complicated by Ecuador’s 2002 legislation requiring all OCP Consortium companies to 
pay a levy of US 1.20 per barrel of oil transported through the pipeline, the revenues from 
which are directed into an oil stabilization fund.135 As Van Gelder correctly notes, the 
policy makes clear that state “has a direct interest in the construction of the OCP 
pipeline.”136  This incentive has been reinforced by the state’s association with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international finance institutions, 
particularly in so far as these institutions have predicated future lending to the state on its 
willingness to adopt certain economic and environmental policies in support of oil 
industry activity in Ecuador. Beginning in 2000, legislation revamped this fund as part of 
a series of IMF structural adjustment programs in Ecuador with the eventual result that 
70% of all OCP revenues deposited in the fund are committed to servicing the country’s 
external debt and an additional 10-20 % are put into an “interest bearing deposit account 
held overseas which will be drawn upon only in the event that oil prices fall below a 
                                                 
134 Van Gelder, 6-8. 
135 Van Gelder, 11. 




benchmark price.”137  
A more immediate result of the 2000 Ley de Transformación Económica del 
Ecuador [Economic Transformation Law, or Ley Trole I] was to establish legal 
provisions for the construction of the OCP.138 Failure to comply with this IMF 
requirement would have compromised Ecuador’s ability to receive a pending IMF loan as 
well as future loans from international sources at a time when its external debt exceeded 
$16 billion.139 Clearly the interests of the state have been shaped by those of its creditors. 
Despite their influence, creditors and other international actors are largely absent 
from the most direct confrontations involving TAN actors (and from the literature that 
investigates these contentious actions) while states are often placed in the center of such 
conflict. This may be a result of certain campaign strategies such as establishing short, 
causal links and vilifying the target. However, this is not necessarily an effective 
approach for two reasons.  
First, the state is caught in a vicious cycle of fragmentation, collapse and 
reconstitution. For example, Latin Finance noted in 2002 that “During the 30 months it 
took to design the financial structure for the Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados (OCP) 
pipeline and find backers for the project, Ecuador went through three presidents and 
nearly half a dozen finance ministers, defaulted on its Brady bonds and Eurobonds, 
suffered a military coup and adopted the US dollar as its national currency.”140  
Furthermore, the state may intentionally cleanse itself of officials who draw fire 
from important international actors. For example, Rafael Correa (current President of 
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Ecuador) resigned from his post as the Economy Minister in 2005 following intense 
national and international scrutiny of his plan to direct a larger percentage of the OCP oil 
stabilization fund towards social spending, or more precisely, away from the IMF.141 As 
noted previously, such a shifting political character undermines institutional maturation 
and frustrates attempts to establish accountability.  
Second, a state in a position of compromised sovereignty, such as that in which 
Ecuador finds itself, is likely to be incapable of resisting the demands of international 
actors holding significant material leverage. The targeted state, caught between mutually 
exclusive demands, must weigh the relative significance of a possible loss of legitimacy 
against a potentially punitive reaction from the external system. One likely outcome of 
this dilemma is exemplified by the OCP case: the state does not challenge its position in 
the external political order and relies for continued internal control on its monopoly on 
coercive force, engaging its military and police forces to act in the supposed national 
interest.  
Regardless of case-specific details, it is clear that all states must account for fact 
that the international arena is replete with power inequalities that constrain viable options 
and promote self-replication. The bottom-line implication for TAN effectiveness and 
predictive theorizing is clear: the combination of competing norms and unequal power 
structures is certain to challenge and likely to undermine the importance of any form of 
leverage, whether moral or material, that a network can expect to gain over a target state.  
Finally, even where effective leverage is fully available to a TAN, one can ask 
whether outcomes produced by such TAN strategies are meaningful. This line of 
argument takes aim at the piecemeal strategy of the TAN campaign by questioning 
                                                 




whether campaign successes (i.e. individual policy changes) can be expected to have a 
cumulative impact on the target’s orientation or, more importantly, on the political 
structure that supports the target’s offensive behaviors. To couch this point in Keck and 
Sikkink’s language, the issue is whether individual campaign successes can truly promote 
a shift in norms, such that changes to the target’s policies translate into an adjustment in 
its fundamental priorities and self-definition, which in turn contributes to the 
consolidation and expansion of particular international norms.  
Keck and Sikkink’s static conceptualization of the international system and its 
actors did not lead them to comment on these challenges. However, as the idea of 
transboundary environmental issues has grown in popularity, other scholars have realized 
the importance of addressing the splintered nature of the international arena and the 
uneasy coexistence of multiple norms. For example, Sari has contributed to an on-going 
discussion of the possibility of creating an international environmental-human rights 
ombudsman. Zarsky, advisor to Sari, has presented ten case studies that collectively 
demonstrated a need for such an international actor, and detailed a proposal for the 
establishment of the position. The development of a central control charged with 
efficiently managing and resolving national environmental issues could perhaps assist in 
homogenizing the norms that inform the behavior of international actors, with increased 
campaign effectiveness deriving from more efficient inter-level articulation as one of the 
potential benefits accruing to advocacy networks. Of course, a concentration of control 
would likely be a solution most attractive to those actors interested in reinforcing current 
structural power relations. A more promising solution would entail the institutionalization 




prioritizes non-commercial values. In the Ecuadorian example, COICA most closely 
resembles such an institution; its experiences warrant close observation by theorists.  
In general, it follows from the analysis of the effectiveness of various strategies 
practiced by the Ecuadorian TAN and from the wide-ranging visions provided by 
scholars that TANs are theoretically capable of pioneering strategies and conceptual 
approaches to advocacy that have the potential to encourage new patterns of interaction. 
It is not clear that this capability can consistently be translated into action or, assuming 
they can be put into practice, whether their individual impacts might be cumulative. 
Furthermore, given the potential for organizational change (witness the evolution of 
COICA) and the certainty of contextual change (as in the growing popularity of virtual 
advocacy), it remains to be seen whether Keck and Sikkink’s formulation will continue to 























 As promised, this paper has pointed to a number of underlying conceptual 
problems. While this exercise was not meant to fully address such concerns, it remains 
appropriate at this juncture to gather and summarize these issues for the benefit of present 
clarity and future research. 
 One central theme has been the existence of an international political and 
economic structure which prioritizes values that are hostile to environmental preservation 
and non-selective respect for social and cultural diversity. This is not meant as an attack 
on the capitalist system; indeed, extensive environmental and social damages have been 
perpetrated by states of all economic and political stripes. However, the current 
international system actively promotes the notion that national development can only be 
obtained by the prioritization of unregulated, capitalistic economic policies. The national 
interest has been defined in purely economic terms, and the state has been encouraged to 
adopt a corporate mindset in service of this supposedly singular purpose. Thus, the state 
finds no value in ecological integrity or social harmony that cannot be expressed in 
dollars and cents; instead, caring for the environment is regarded as restricting activities 
in support of capital accumulation and reducing profits by internalizing costs.  
 The state’s obligation to earn money has overrun any alternative 




civil and human rights of its citizens or as the steward of the environment and other 
common goods. As a result of this orientation, states are amenable to policies that attract 
industry and foreign investment, even where this occurs at the expense of the citizenry 
and the national environment. For example, a state might view its unprotected labor 
force, environmental haven (weak regulations and lax enforcement) policies and weak or 
nonextant environmental agencies as comparative advantages that attract industry and 
thereby justify the social or ecological abuses that are written into such policies.142 Most 
disturbing is a state’s willingness to violate its own laws or commit its military or police 
to the protection of industry; such extreme (yet common) policies effectively constitute a 
transfer of political power from state to industry.  
 Furthermore, where the state in question is located within the Third World, its 
tendency towards dependency on resource-intensive development is reinforced by the 
economic power structure of the international system. In particular, the unequal 
relationship between First and Third World economies favor the former as provider of 
capital and technical resources and as the designer of trade and other economic policies. 
Bryant and Bailey characterize this imbalanced relationship as one reminiscent of 
colonial times, when the ‘progress’ supported by IFIs (International Financial 
Institutions) “was measured in terms of trees felled, valleys flooded, minerals extracted 
and acreage dedicated to cash crops or cattle ranching.”143 Noting that IFIs promote 
structural adjustment programs that encourage states to their view natural resources as 
untapped economic reserves, the authors reaffirm that IFI policies result in double 
damage: first by lending in support of development projects that have negative 
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environmental and social consequences and then by demanding that indebted states make 
payment on project loans “... by cashing in natural resources.”144  
 External debt, resource-intensive development and state dependency on 
multinational corporations (for foreign direct investment, technical expertise and 
infrastructure development) together result in a self-replicating economic necessity, 
prioritization of corporate values, and state complicity in the consequences of 
unconstrained industrial activity.145 Once caught in this cycle, a state that abandons 
environmentally degrading or socially oppressive development projects risks that 
international creditors will remove it from the economic life support system.146 Given 
that the external structure demands a state to adopt a corporatist orientation, can 
responsibility be assigned to a state? Is there a chance that advocates can impact state 
orientation or does the state’s articulation within the international system have a 
deterministic effect that renders a target unwilling, if not incapable, of responding to 
advocacy? If so, should activists focus on their efforts on First World states or IFIs in 
hopes of a trickle-down effect or, as Tarrow might say, a normative cascade?147
 First, it is clear that, in theory, a state can select from among a number of 
orientations with respect to its citizens and natural environment. The fact that options 
exist is demonstrated by empirical evidence of a range of state orientations and 
documented by organizations like Transparency International and MAR which conduct 
comparative research and construct databases. The availability of alternative orientations 
is also a staple concept in theoretical work; for example, Bryant and Bailey find that there 
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is a “central paradox in the state’s function,” meaning that a state can and must choose to 
act as either the steward or destroyer of the natural environment.148  
 Second, how can advocates encourage the target state to embrace an orientation 
that does not prioritize development above all other values? While the strategies 
enumerated by Keck and Sikkink are certainly important and useful, these will be most 
effective where they are utilized in order to promote ideas and visions of alternative 
realities. The size and economic prowess of a select number of INGOs notwithstanding, 
the power of a network comes primarily from its ability to initiate a public dialogue and 
to introduce interpretations that diverge from and challenge the official discourse and 
logic. The definition of campaign success must be reevaluated: the standard expectation 
that multiple policy changes will cause a norm shift is best read in reverse. Recalling the 
close association between IFI lending, fraternity of state and industry, and social and 
environmental injustice, the thought that a succession of disjunctive policy changes and 
uncoordinated advocacy in various “issue areas” might result in wholesale normative 
change on the part of the target should be discarded in favor of a holistic approach.  
 In general, the design of a campaign should flow from an understanding of the 
relative position of the target within the external power structure. This variable matters 
enormously for campaign outcome since targeting an economically dependent state does 
not alter the power imbalances that encourage the state to adopt offensive policies and 
since, in such circumstances, looking to the international arena for traditional leverage is 
inherently illogical. 
 These suggestions for improved campaign effectiveness have meaning for the 
enhancement of the predictive power of TAN theories. First, the problems of defining, 
                                                 




measuring and evaluating campaign success should be clarified prior to data collection 
and analysis. In order to allow for true comparative research, Keck and Sikkink’s 
treatment of success as a campaign-specific and policy-centered variable should be 
replaced with a more standardized and meaningful conceptualization. Second, theories 
must account for the implications of the unequal power structure of the international 
system, or at least offer a theoretical specification and a measurement of target 
dependency.   
 A case study should begin with the widest lens available in order to understand 
the target’s position within its larger context; from such an angle, it should be possible to 
assess the external risk to the target should it choose to comply with network demands. If 
a given risk level does not essentially immobilize the target, then analysis on the state and 
sub-state levels may follow. However, where the state is severely constrained by the 
external structure then theorists must consider the possibility that no campaign, no matter 
its framing choices or density, can impact the orientation of the target unless it also 
challenges the larger structure. Clearly, the international dimension should factor 


















As noted in the literature review, Keck and Sikkink too often resort to 
operationalizing actors in static and dichotomous terms. Relying on such broad 
conceptualizations surely increases the possibility of broad application of the TAN theory 
by allowing for a large universe of relevant cases. However, by undermining specificity 
of concept definition in order and thereby increasing generalizability, the authors have 
sacrificed predictive power.  
The TAN theory assumes that democratic states will react to pressures from 
within and without in particular and predictable ways. In fact, Keck and Sikkink’s own 
description of the ‘boomerang pattern’ of activism implies that the target state features a 
mixture of democratic and undemocratic policies. Thus, their theory demands that the 
concept be expanded to encompass more than blanket democracy (or not). A more useful 
conceptualization will rely on a number of indicators of the accessibility of the state. To 
this end, the democratic nature of a given state might be assessed via indicators of 
substate actors’ access to the state, such as: 
1) Formal channels for public participation, including a transparent electoral system, 
referendums, and procedures for the redress of grievances (i.e. civil and constitutional 
courts). 




demonstrate, and public forums for dialogue between officials and citizens. 
Keck and Sikkink acknowledge the importance of international leverage, yet they 
do not offer a method whereby the relative importance to the target of various leverages 
can be assessed. Ideally, these leverages, which condition the preferences of the target 
and thereby its decision-making, should be ranked by their importance to the state; this 
could be achieved on a case-specific basis by employing a rational choice modeling of 
external pressures and state preferences. However, a generally applicable approach 
should also be articulated.  
To this end, indicators of state vulnerability should be categorized according to 
the nature of the repercussions that the state will suffer should it choose to not respond as 
requested. For example, the Ecuadorian state hoped to borrow extensively to fund the 
OCP project; the activists worked to tie project funding to international environmental 
standards, while the IMF tied all future funding for Ecuador to the completion of the 
OCP; the state was able to secure the funds needed for the pipeline project despite the 
departure of WestLB; therefore, the repercussions of not complying with IMF pressures 
regarding the OCP were more far-reaching than the repercussions for ignoring activist 
pressures. Essentially, it is inappropriate to assume that any state will reflexively submit 
to international pressure; conversely, it is reasonable to expect that a state will respond to 
the incentive structure created by pressures from various international actors. The central 
idea here is that different sources and articulations of international pressure should be 
expected to have different meanings for the target state and therefore varying impacts on 
state responsiveness. The following baseline indicators for assessing state vulnerability 




1) Extensive reliance on external assistance from international actors who tie the terms of 
their current and future support or penalties to particular state behaviors and policies. 
2) Ratification of international commitments that impose penalties on member states for 
violations of their provisions.  
3) Signature of international commitments carrying non-compliance penalties; or 
ratification or signature of international commitments not carrying non-compliance 
penalties.  
Hypothesis. Changes to the independent variables necessitate a slight reformulation of 
Keck and Sikkink’s hypothesis statement, as follows: 
1) A network cannot influence state policy where positive response by the target state to 
network pressures carries possible repercussions for the state which outweigh potential 
benefits. 
2) A network can only succeed where it is sufficiently large and dense to create public 
awareness of the campaign and its message. 
3) Positive public perception of the campaign (belief in the reliability of the campaign 
members and the content of the campaign message) is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for a network to succeed in influencing state policy.  
Data Collection. Adoption of the preceding recommendations complicates data 
collection. For example, case selection cannot draw from data sets that rely on 
democratic procedural minimums to score states as democratic or not. However, data 
collection certainly remains possible. There are a number of data sets that can be used as 
a sample pool and might also serve in the development of a case-specific rational choice 




citizen and private sector perceptions of state corruption; such data could support a 
rational choice preference specification that claims that substate activists are unlikely to 
expect that they can influence their state, and therefore are prone to seek external 
alliances. Reporters Without Borders hosts a ‘Worldwide Press Freedoms Index’ that 
measures press freedom from state intervention; this data could be used to support an 
argument about the lack of informal venues for citizen participation and expression. The 
United Nations, a body that frequently sponsors international agreements, publishes lists 
of state members to international agreements and explanations of relevant non-
compliance penalties. A number of accessible sources, including the multilateral financial 
institutions, publish information related to the external debt and other factors impacting 
the national economy. Inter-state trade information is also widely available.  
Measurement of Network Characteristics. As indicated in the literature review, 
researchers have expressed substantial frustration with the methodological challenges of 
measuring the size and density of a transnational network. The difficulty is quite clearly 
inherent in the task.  
The crucial problem is the difficulty of establishing a valid measure of ‘density.’ 
This is partly caused by the vagueness of Keck and Sikkink’s terminology; some scholars 
have interpreted density to mean the number of contact points (interactions) between 
actor1 and actor2, while others find that counting contact points without establishing the 
frequency or extent of actor interaction. An ideal operationalization of the ‘density’ 
variable should interrogate the nature of network members’ interaction. A case-specific 
approach might utilize a survey designed to measure interaction quality. Survey questions 




actors are aware of a hierarchy among them, or how contact was initially established or 
sustained over time. 
However, a more generally useful approach is necessary. Two pragmatic 
measurements, one each for the virtual and the face-to-face network dimensions, can 
guide the development of an approach with broader utility. To measure the latter, the 
presence of at least one ‘umbrella organization,’ or voluntary grouping of many 
organizations into a single unit, is an excellent indicator of the presence of a network. 
Furthermore, the coverage (or number and diversity of the groups that are represented by 
the umbrella organization) provides a measure of complexity and density.   
The virtual dimension is an important aspect of any contemporary transnational 
network, and one completely ignored by Keck and Sikkink. The internet presents unique 
challenges to and opportunities for the measurement of network density and size. One 
solution known as “link analysis” developed out of network analysis. Essentially, this 
method relies on those internet search engines, including Google, that are designed to 
rank search result pages according to “how many links point to the page.”149 Thompson 
explains that the number of links to any given page is an indicator of its importance to 
other on-line users and pages. Therefore, link analysis suggests that the ranking of the 
returns on a Google search is indicative of the density of connections to that page. Larson 
sums up the argument by stating that 
Social network analysis holds great potential for identifying and analyzing social   
phenomena that might otherwise not be visible. Its most enduring contributions make use 
of a fundamental assumption that things are better understood in relation to other things 
in their environment. That is, rather than hoping to uncover the essence embodied by an 
entity B whether person, group, or society B SNA looks for meaning in the relations 
between entities.150  
                                                 
149 Thompson, 60. 





Conclusions. This study has established that Keck and Sikkink’s formulation did not 
offer substantial predictive value in the case of the Ecuadorian OCP TAN. Empirical 
application and theoretical debate support the conclusion that this theoretical weakness 
stems from a superficial treatment of the international structure in which all states are 
embedded. It therefore seems misguided and unreasonable to wholly assign either blame 
or credit for a campaign outcome to the network itself, as is the tendency in the relevant 
literature. 
It is not necessary to completely abandon Keck and Sikkink’s original 
formulation. It is far more valuable to problematize and expand on the authors’ original 
independent variables so that these become more useful indicators of the complexity of 
the international system and enhance the ability to theoretically account for a wider range 
of variation on the dependent variable. All instances and outcomes of transnational 
activism are complicated by network interaction with the larger system that is 
characterized by uneven distributions of power. Theories of transnational advocacy 
should direct attention to the possible impacts of this interaction on advocacy campaign 
outcomes. Furthermore, it is possible to access data in support of the expanded research 
design making this a viable alternative design. If successful, the research proposed herein 
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CEPE  Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana 
 Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation 
 
CODIGEM     Corporación de Desarrollo e Investigación Geológico-Minero Metalurgica     
                         Corporation for Geological-Mining-Metallurgical Research and Development 
 
COICA Coordinador de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica 
  Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin 
 
CONAIE   Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador 
   Nacional Confederation of Indigenous Nations of Ecuador 
 
DIGEMA Direccion General de Medio Ambiente  
             General Directorate of the Environment 
 
DINAMA     Dirrecion Nacional de Medio Ambiente  
          National Directorate of the Environment  
 
ESMAP       Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme (World Bank Group) 
 
GEF  Global Environment Facility 
IERAC   Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización 
   Ecuadorian Agrarian Reform and Colonization Institute 
 
MEM          Ministerio de Energía y Minas  
          Ministery of Energy and Mines 
 
MMA           Ministerio de Medio Ambiente  
          Ministry of the Environment 
 
OCP          Oleoducto de Crudo Pesado  
          Heavy Crude Pipeline 
 





SMA            Subsecretaria de Medio Ambiente  
         Subsecretary of the Environment 
 
 
SOTE           Sistema de Oleoducto Trans-Ecuatoriano  
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